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-rw-r--r--kernel/bpf/verifier.c2319
1 files changed, 1846 insertions, 473 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 02a021c524ab..af2819d5c8ee 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -25,6 +25,9 @@
#include <linux/btf_ids.h>
#include <linux/poison.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/cpumask.h>
+#include <linux/bpf_mem_alloc.h>
+#include <net/xdp.h>
#include "disasm.h"
@@ -39,6 +42,9 @@ static const struct bpf_verifier_ops * const bpf_verifier_ops[] = {
#undef BPF_LINK_TYPE
};
+struct bpf_mem_alloc bpf_global_percpu_ma;
+static bool bpf_global_percpu_ma_set;
+
/* bpf_check() is a static code analyzer that walks eBPF program
* instruction by instruction and updates register/stack state.
* All paths of conditional branches are analyzed until 'bpf_exit' insn.
@@ -302,7 +308,7 @@ struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta {
/* arg_{btf,btf_id,owning_ref} are used by kfunc-specific handling,
* generally to pass info about user-defined local kptr types to later
* verification logic
- * bpf_obj_drop
+ * bpf_obj_drop/bpf_percpu_obj_drop
* Record the local kptr type to be drop'd
* bpf_refcount_acquire (via KF_ARG_PTR_TO_REFCOUNTED_KPTR arg type)
* Record the local kptr type to be refcount_incr'd and use
@@ -334,6 +340,7 @@ struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta {
struct btf *btf_vmlinux;
static DEFINE_MUTEX(bpf_verifier_lock);
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(bpf_percpu_ma_lock);
static const struct bpf_line_info *
find_linfo(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 insn_off)
@@ -540,12 +547,12 @@ static bool is_dynptr_ref_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id)
return func_id == BPF_FUNC_dynptr_data;
}
-static bool is_callback_calling_kfunc(u32 btf_id);
+static bool is_sync_callback_calling_kfunc(u32 btf_id);
+static bool is_bpf_throw_kfunc(struct bpf_insn *insn);
-static bool is_callback_calling_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id)
+static bool is_sync_callback_calling_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id)
{
return func_id == BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem ||
- func_id == BPF_FUNC_timer_set_callback ||
func_id == BPF_FUNC_find_vma ||
func_id == BPF_FUNC_loop ||
func_id == BPF_FUNC_user_ringbuf_drain;
@@ -556,6 +563,18 @@ static bool is_async_callback_calling_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id)
return func_id == BPF_FUNC_timer_set_callback;
}
+static bool is_callback_calling_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id)
+{
+ return is_sync_callback_calling_function(func_id) ||
+ is_async_callback_calling_function(func_id);
+}
+
+static bool is_sync_callback_calling_insn(struct bpf_insn *insn)
+{
+ return (bpf_helper_call(insn) && is_sync_callback_calling_function(insn->imm)) ||
+ (bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(insn) && is_sync_callback_calling_kfunc(insn->imm));
+}
+
static bool is_storage_get_function(enum bpf_func_id func_id)
{
return func_id == BPF_FUNC_sk_storage_get ||
@@ -1170,7 +1189,12 @@ static bool is_dynptr_type_expected(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg
static void __mark_reg_known_zero(struct bpf_reg_state *reg);
+static bool in_rcu_cs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env);
+
+static bool is_kfunc_rcu_protected(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta);
+
static int mark_stack_slots_iter(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+ struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta,
struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int insn_idx,
struct btf *btf, u32 btf_id, int nr_slots)
{
@@ -1191,6 +1215,12 @@ static int mark_stack_slots_iter(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
__mark_reg_known_zero(st);
st->type = PTR_TO_STACK; /* we don't have dedicated reg type */
+ if (is_kfunc_rcu_protected(meta)) {
+ if (in_rcu_cs(env))
+ st->type |= MEM_RCU;
+ else
+ st->type |= PTR_UNTRUSTED;
+ }
st->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
st->ref_obj_id = i == 0 ? id : 0;
st->iter.btf = btf;
@@ -1265,7 +1295,7 @@ static bool is_iter_reg_valid_uninit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
return true;
}
-static bool is_iter_reg_valid_init(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
+static int is_iter_reg_valid_init(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
struct btf *btf, u32 btf_id, int nr_slots)
{
struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
@@ -1273,26 +1303,28 @@ static bool is_iter_reg_valid_init(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_
spi = iter_get_spi(env, reg, nr_slots);
if (spi < 0)
- return false;
+ return -EINVAL;
for (i = 0; i < nr_slots; i++) {
struct bpf_stack_state *slot = &state->stack[spi - i];
struct bpf_reg_state *st = &slot->spilled_ptr;
+ if (st->type & PTR_UNTRUSTED)
+ return -EPROTO;
/* only main (first) slot has ref_obj_id set */
if (i == 0 && !st->ref_obj_id)
- return false;
+ return -EINVAL;
if (i != 0 && st->ref_obj_id)
- return false;
+ return -EINVAL;
if (st->iter.btf != btf || st->iter.btf_id != btf_id)
- return false;
+ return -EINVAL;
for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++)
if (slot->slot_type[j] != STACK_ITER)
- return false;
+ return -EINVAL;
}
- return true;
+ return 0;
}
/* Check if given stack slot is "special":
@@ -1339,6 +1371,50 @@ static void scrub_spilled_slot(u8 *stype)
*stype = STACK_MISC;
}
+static void print_scalar_ranges(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+ const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
+ const char **sep)
+{
+ struct {
+ const char *name;
+ u64 val;
+ bool omit;
+ } minmaxs[] = {
+ {"smin", reg->smin_value, reg->smin_value == S64_MIN},
+ {"smax", reg->smax_value, reg->smax_value == S64_MAX},
+ {"umin", reg->umin_value, reg->umin_value == 0},
+ {"umax", reg->umax_value, reg->umax_value == U64_MAX},
+ {"smin32", (s64)reg->s32_min_value, reg->s32_min_value == S32_MIN},
+ {"smax32", (s64)reg->s32_max_value, reg->s32_max_value == S32_MAX},
+ {"umin32", reg->u32_min_value, reg->u32_min_value == 0},
+ {"umax32", reg->u32_max_value, reg->u32_max_value == U32_MAX},
+ }, *m1, *m2, *mend = &minmaxs[ARRAY_SIZE(minmaxs)];
+ bool neg1, neg2;
+
+ for (m1 = &minmaxs[0]; m1 < mend; m1++) {
+ if (m1->omit)
+ continue;
+
+ neg1 = m1->name[0] == 's' && (s64)m1->val < 0;
+
+ verbose(env, "%s%s=", *sep, m1->name);
+ *sep = ",";
+
+ for (m2 = m1 + 2; m2 < mend; m2 += 2) {
+ if (m2->omit || m2->val != m1->val)
+ continue;
+ /* don't mix negatives with positives */
+ neg2 = m2->name[0] == 's' && (s64)m2->val < 0;
+ if (neg2 != neg1)
+ continue;
+ m2->omit = true;
+ verbose(env, "%s=", m2->name);
+ }
+
+ verbose(env, m1->name[0] == 's' ? "%lld" : "%llu", m1->val);
+ }
+}
+
static void print_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
const struct bpf_func_state *state,
bool print_all)
@@ -1402,34 +1478,13 @@ static void print_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
*/
verbose_a("imm=%llx", reg->var_off.value);
} else {
- if (reg->smin_value != reg->umin_value &&
- reg->smin_value != S64_MIN)
- verbose_a("smin=%lld", (long long)reg->smin_value);
- if (reg->smax_value != reg->umax_value &&
- reg->smax_value != S64_MAX)
- verbose_a("smax=%lld", (long long)reg->smax_value);
- if (reg->umin_value != 0)
- verbose_a("umin=%llu", (unsigned long long)reg->umin_value);
- if (reg->umax_value != U64_MAX)
- verbose_a("umax=%llu", (unsigned long long)reg->umax_value);
+ print_scalar_ranges(env, reg, &sep);
if (!tnum_is_unknown(reg->var_off)) {
char tn_buf[48];
tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
verbose_a("var_off=%s", tn_buf);
}
- if (reg->s32_min_value != reg->smin_value &&
- reg->s32_min_value != S32_MIN)
- verbose_a("s32_min=%d", (int)(reg->s32_min_value));
- if (reg->s32_max_value != reg->smax_value &&
- reg->s32_max_value != S32_MAX)
- verbose_a("s32_max=%d", (int)(reg->s32_max_value));
- if (reg->u32_min_value != reg->umin_value &&
- reg->u32_min_value != U32_MIN)
- verbose_a("u32_min=%d", (int)(reg->u32_min_value));
- if (reg->u32_max_value != reg->umax_value &&
- reg->u32_max_value != U32_MAX)
- verbose_a("u32_max=%d", (int)(reg->u32_max_value));
}
#undef verbose_a
@@ -1513,7 +1568,8 @@ static void print_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
if (state->in_async_callback_fn)
verbose(env, " async_cb");
verbose(env, "\n");
- mark_verifier_state_clean(env);
+ if (!print_all)
+ mark_verifier_state_clean(env);
}
static inline u32 vlog_alignment(u32 pos)
@@ -1746,7 +1802,9 @@ static int copy_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *dst_state,
return -ENOMEM;
dst_state->jmp_history_cnt = src->jmp_history_cnt;
- /* if dst has more stack frames then src frame, free them */
+ /* if dst has more stack frames then src frame, free them, this is also
+ * necessary in case of exceptional exits using bpf_throw.
+ */
for (i = src->curframe + 1; i <= dst_state->curframe; i++) {
free_func_state(dst_state->frame[i]);
dst_state->frame[i] = NULL;
@@ -1760,6 +1818,9 @@ static int copy_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *dst_state,
dst_state->parent = src->parent;
dst_state->first_insn_idx = src->first_insn_idx;
dst_state->last_insn_idx = src->last_insn_idx;
+ dst_state->dfs_depth = src->dfs_depth;
+ dst_state->callback_unroll_depth = src->callback_unroll_depth;
+ dst_state->used_as_loop_entry = src->used_as_loop_entry;
for (i = 0; i <= src->curframe; i++) {
dst = dst_state->frame[i];
if (!dst) {
@@ -1775,11 +1836,203 @@ static int copy_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *dst_state,
return 0;
}
+static u32 state_htab_size(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
+{
+ return env->prog->len;
+}
+
+static struct bpf_verifier_state_list **explored_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx)
+{
+ struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state;
+ struct bpf_func_state *state = cur->frame[cur->curframe];
+
+ return &env->explored_states[(idx ^ state->callsite) % state_htab_size(env)];
+}
+
+static bool same_callsites(struct bpf_verifier_state *a, struct bpf_verifier_state *b)
+{
+ int fr;
+
+ if (a->curframe != b->curframe)
+ return false;
+
+ for (fr = a->curframe; fr >= 0; fr--)
+ if (a->frame[fr]->callsite != b->frame[fr]->callsite)
+ return false;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+/* Open coded iterators allow back-edges in the state graph in order to
+ * check unbounded loops that iterators.
+ *
+ * In is_state_visited() it is necessary to know if explored states are
+ * part of some loops in order to decide whether non-exact states
+ * comparison could be used:
+ * - non-exact states comparison establishes sub-state relation and uses
+ * read and precision marks to do so, these marks are propagated from
+ * children states and thus are not guaranteed to be final in a loop;
+ * - exact states comparison just checks if current and explored states
+ * are identical (and thus form a back-edge).
+ *
+ * Paper "A New Algorithm for Identifying Loops in Decompilation"
+ * by Tao Wei, Jian Mao, Wei Zou and Yu Chen [1] presents a convenient
+ * algorithm for loop structure detection and gives an overview of
+ * relevant terminology. It also has helpful illustrations.
+ *
+ * [1] https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:15784067
+ *
+ * We use a similar algorithm but because loop nested structure is
+ * irrelevant for verifier ours is significantly simpler and resembles
+ * strongly connected components algorithm from Sedgewick's textbook.
+ *
+ * Define topmost loop entry as a first node of the loop traversed in a
+ * depth first search starting from initial state. The goal of the loop
+ * tracking algorithm is to associate topmost loop entries with states
+ * derived from these entries.
+ *
+ * For each step in the DFS states traversal algorithm needs to identify
+ * the following situations:
+ *
+ * initial initial initial
+ * | | |
+ * V V V
+ * ... ... .---------> hdr
+ * | | | |
+ * V V | V
+ * cur .-> succ | .------...
+ * | | | | | |
+ * V | V | V V
+ * succ '-- cur | ... ...
+ * | | |
+ * | V V
+ * | succ <- cur
+ * | |
+ * | V
+ * | ...
+ * | |
+ * '----'
+ *
+ * (A) successor state of cur (B) successor state of cur or it's entry
+ * not yet traversed are in current DFS path, thus cur and succ
+ * are members of the same outermost loop
+ *
+ * initial initial
+ * | |
+ * V V
+ * ... ...
+ * | |
+ * V V
+ * .------... .------...
+ * | | | |
+ * V V V V
+ * .-> hdr ... ... ...
+ * | | | | |
+ * | V V V V
+ * | succ <- cur succ <- cur
+ * | | |
+ * | V V
+ * | ... ...
+ * | | |
+ * '----' exit
+ *
+ * (C) successor state of cur is a part of some loop but this loop
+ * does not include cur or successor state is not in a loop at all.
+ *
+ * Algorithm could be described as the following python code:
+ *
+ * traversed = set() # Set of traversed nodes
+ * entries = {} # Mapping from node to loop entry
+ * depths = {} # Depth level assigned to graph node
+ * path = set() # Current DFS path
+ *
+ * # Find outermost loop entry known for n
+ * def get_loop_entry(n):
+ * h = entries.get(n, None)
+ * while h in entries and entries[h] != h:
+ * h = entries[h]
+ * return h
+ *
+ * # Update n's loop entry if h's outermost entry comes
+ * # before n's outermost entry in current DFS path.
+ * def update_loop_entry(n, h):
+ * n1 = get_loop_entry(n) or n
+ * h1 = get_loop_entry(h) or h
+ * if h1 in path and depths[h1] <= depths[n1]:
+ * entries[n] = h1
+ *
+ * def dfs(n, depth):
+ * traversed.add(n)
+ * path.add(n)
+ * depths[n] = depth
+ * for succ in G.successors(n):
+ * if succ not in traversed:
+ * # Case A: explore succ and update cur's loop entry
+ * # only if succ's entry is in current DFS path.
+ * dfs(succ, depth + 1)
+ * h = get_loop_entry(succ)
+ * update_loop_entry(n, h)
+ * else:
+ * # Case B or C depending on `h1 in path` check in update_loop_entry().
+ * update_loop_entry(n, succ)
+ * path.remove(n)
+ *
+ * To adapt this algorithm for use with verifier:
+ * - use st->branch == 0 as a signal that DFS of succ had been finished
+ * and cur's loop entry has to be updated (case A), handle this in
+ * update_branch_counts();
+ * - use st->branch > 0 as a signal that st is in the current DFS path;
+ * - handle cases B and C in is_state_visited();
+ * - update topmost loop entry for intermediate states in get_loop_entry().
+ */
+static struct bpf_verifier_state *get_loop_entry(struct bpf_verifier_state *st)
+{
+ struct bpf_verifier_state *topmost = st->loop_entry, *old;
+
+ while (topmost && topmost->loop_entry && topmost != topmost->loop_entry)
+ topmost = topmost->loop_entry;
+ /* Update loop entries for intermediate states to avoid this
+ * traversal in future get_loop_entry() calls.
+ */
+ while (st && st->loop_entry != topmost) {
+ old = st->loop_entry;
+ st->loop_entry = topmost;
+ st = old;
+ }
+ return topmost;
+}
+
+static void update_loop_entry(struct bpf_verifier_state *cur, struct bpf_verifier_state *hdr)
+{
+ struct bpf_verifier_state *cur1, *hdr1;
+
+ cur1 = get_loop_entry(cur) ?: cur;
+ hdr1 = get_loop_entry(hdr) ?: hdr;
+ /* The head1->branches check decides between cases B and C in
+ * comment for get_loop_entry(). If hdr1->branches == 0 then
+ * head's topmost loop entry is not in current DFS path,
+ * hence 'cur' and 'hdr' are not in the same loop and there is
+ * no need to update cur->loop_entry.
+ */
+ if (hdr1->branches && hdr1->dfs_depth <= cur1->dfs_depth) {
+ cur->loop_entry = hdr;
+ hdr->used_as_loop_entry = true;
+ }
+}
+
static void update_branch_counts(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_state *st)
{
while (st) {
u32 br = --st->branches;
+ /* br == 0 signals that DFS exploration for 'st' is finished,
+ * thus it is necessary to update parent's loop entry if it
+ * turned out that st is a part of some loop.
+ * This is a part of 'case A' in get_loop_entry() comment.
+ */
+ if (br == 0 && st->parent && st->loop_entry)
+ update_loop_entry(st->parent, st->loop_entry);
+
/* WARN_ON(br > 1) technically makes sense here,
* but see comment in push_stack(), hence:
*/
@@ -2452,6 +2705,68 @@ static int add_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off)
return env->subprog_cnt - 1;
}
+static int bpf_find_exception_callback_insn_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
+{
+ struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = env->prog->aux;
+ struct btf *btf = aux->btf;
+ const struct btf_type *t;
+ u32 main_btf_id, id;
+ const char *name;
+ int ret, i;
+
+ /* Non-zero func_info_cnt implies valid btf */
+ if (!aux->func_info_cnt)
+ return 0;
+ main_btf_id = aux->func_info[0].type_id;
+
+ t = btf_type_by_id(btf, main_btf_id);
+ if (!t) {
+ verbose(env, "invalid btf id for main subprog in func_info\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ name = btf_find_decl_tag_value(btf, t, -1, "exception_callback:");
+ if (IS_ERR(name)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(name);
+ /* If there is no tag present, there is no exception callback */
+ if (ret == -ENOENT)
+ ret = 0;
+ else if (ret == -EEXIST)
+ verbose(env, "multiple exception callback tags for main subprog\n");
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ ret = btf_find_by_name_kind(btf, name, BTF_KIND_FUNC);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ verbose(env, "exception callback '%s' could not be found in BTF\n", name);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ id = ret;
+ t = btf_type_by_id(btf, id);
+ if (btf_func_linkage(t) != BTF_FUNC_GLOBAL) {
+ verbose(env, "exception callback '%s' must have global linkage\n", name);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ ret = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < aux->func_info_cnt; i++) {
+ if (aux->func_info[i].type_id != id)
+ continue;
+ ret = aux->func_info[i].insn_off;
+ /* Further func_info and subprog checks will also happen
+ * later, so assume this is the right insn_off for now.
+ */
+ if (!ret) {
+ verbose(env, "invalid exception callback insn_off in func_info: 0\n");
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!ret) {
+ verbose(env, "exception callback type id not found in func_info\n");
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
#define MAX_KFUNC_DESCS 256
#define MAX_KFUNC_BTFS 256
@@ -2791,8 +3106,8 @@ bpf_jit_find_kfunc_model(const struct bpf_prog *prog,
static int add_subprog_and_kfunc(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
{
struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog = env->subprog_info;
+ int i, ret, insn_cnt = env->prog->len, ex_cb_insn;
struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi;
- int i, ret, insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
/* Add entry function. */
ret = add_subprog(env, 0);
@@ -2818,6 +3133,26 @@ static int add_subprog_and_kfunc(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
return ret;
}
+ ret = bpf_find_exception_callback_insn_off(env);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ ex_cb_insn = ret;
+
+ /* If ex_cb_insn > 0, this means that the main program has a subprog
+ * marked using BTF decl tag to serve as the exception callback.
+ */
+ if (ex_cb_insn) {
+ ret = add_subprog(env, ex_cb_insn);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ for (i = 1; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
+ if (env->subprog_info[i].start != ex_cb_insn)
+ continue;
+ env->exception_callback_subprog = i;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
/* Add a fake 'exit' subprog which could simplify subprog iteration
* logic. 'subprog_cnt' should not be increased.
*/
@@ -2854,7 +3189,10 @@ static int check_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
goto next;
if (BPF_OP(code) == BPF_EXIT || BPF_OP(code) == BPF_CALL)
goto next;
- off = i + insn[i].off + 1;
+ if (code == (BPF_JMP32 | BPF_JA))
+ off = i + insn[i].imm + 1;
+ else
+ off = i + insn[i].off + 1;
if (off < subprog_start || off >= subprog_end) {
verbose(env, "jump out of range from insn %d to %d\n", i, off);
return -EINVAL;
@@ -2863,9 +3201,10 @@ next:
if (i == subprog_end - 1) {
/* to avoid fall-through from one subprog into another
* the last insn of the subprog should be either exit
- * or unconditional jump back
+ * or unconditional jump back or bpf_throw call
*/
if (code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_EXIT) &&
+ code != (BPF_JMP32 | BPF_JA) &&
code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_JA)) {
verbose(env, "last insn is not an exit or jmp\n");
return -EINVAL;
@@ -3011,8 +3350,10 @@ static bool is_reg64(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,
}
}
+ if (class == BPF_ALU64 && op == BPF_END && (insn->imm == 16 || insn->imm == 32))
+ return false;
+
if (class == BPF_ALU64 || class == BPF_JMP ||
- /* BPF_END always use BPF_ALU class. */
(class == BPF_ALU && op == BPF_END && insn->imm == 64))
return true;
@@ -3021,7 +3362,7 @@ static bool is_reg64(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,
if (class == BPF_LDX) {
if (t != SRC_OP)
- return BPF_SIZE(code) == BPF_DW;
+ return BPF_SIZE(code) == BPF_DW || BPF_MODE(code) == BPF_MEMSX;
/* LDX source must be ptr. */
return true;
}
@@ -3110,13 +3451,11 @@ static void mark_insn_zext(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
reg->subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG;
}
-static int check_reg_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
- enum reg_arg_type t)
+static int __check_reg_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno,
+ enum reg_arg_type t)
{
- struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
- struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe];
struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi + env->insn_idx;
- struct bpf_reg_state *reg, *regs = state->regs;
+ struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
bool rw64;
if (regno >= MAX_BPF_REG) {
@@ -3157,6 +3496,15 @@ static int check_reg_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
return 0;
}
+static int check_reg_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
+ enum reg_arg_type t)
+{
+ struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
+ struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe];
+
+ return __check_reg_arg(env, state->regs, regno, t);
+}
+
static void mark_jmp_point(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx)
{
env->insn_aux_data[idx].jmp_point = true;
@@ -3192,12 +3540,29 @@ static int push_jmp_history(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
/* Backtrack one insn at a time. If idx is not at the top of recorded
* history then previous instruction came from straight line execution.
+ * Return -ENOENT if we exhausted all instructions within given state.
+ *
+ * It's legal to have a bit of a looping with the same starting and ending
+ * insn index within the same state, e.g.: 3->4->5->3, so just because current
+ * instruction index is the same as state's first_idx doesn't mean we are
+ * done. If there is still some jump history left, we should keep going. We
+ * need to take into account that we might have a jump history between given
+ * state's parent and itself, due to checkpointing. In this case, we'll have
+ * history entry recording a jump from last instruction of parent state and
+ * first instruction of given state.
*/
static int get_prev_insn_idx(struct bpf_verifier_state *st, int i,
u32 *history)
{
u32 cnt = *history;
+ if (i == st->first_insn_idx) {
+ if (cnt == 0)
+ return -ENOENT;
+ if (cnt == 1 && st->jmp_history[0].idx == i)
+ return -ENOENT;
+ }
+
if (cnt && st->jmp_history[cnt - 1].idx == i) {
i = st->jmp_history[cnt - 1].prev_idx;
(*history)--;
@@ -3378,6 +3743,8 @@ static void fmt_stack_mask(char *buf, ssize_t buf_sz, u64 stack_mask)
}
}
+static bool calls_callback(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx);
+
/* For given verifier state backtrack_insn() is called from the last insn to
* the first insn. Its purpose is to compute a bitmask of registers and
* stack slots that needs precision in the parent verifier state.
@@ -3418,9 +3785,14 @@ static int backtrack_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx, int subseq_idx,
if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) {
if (!bt_is_reg_set(bt, dreg))
return 0;
- if (opcode == BPF_MOV) {
+ if (opcode == BPF_END || opcode == BPF_NEG) {
+ /* sreg is reserved and unused
+ * dreg still need precision before this insn
+ */
+ return 0;
+ } else if (opcode == BPF_MOV) {
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
- /* dreg = sreg
+ /* dreg = sreg or dreg = (s8, s16, s32)sreg
* dreg needs precision after this insn
* sreg needs precision before this insn
*/
@@ -3548,16 +3920,13 @@ static int backtrack_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx, int subseq_idx,
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
- } else if ((bpf_helper_call(insn) &&
- is_callback_calling_function(insn->imm) &&
- !is_async_callback_calling_function(insn->imm)) ||
- (bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(insn) && is_callback_calling_kfunc(insn->imm))) {
- /* callback-calling helper or kfunc call, which means
- * we are exiting from subprog, but unlike the subprog
- * call handling above, we shouldn't propagate
- * precision of r1-r5 (if any requested), as they are
- * not actually arguments passed directly to callback
- * subprogs
+ } else if (is_sync_callback_calling_insn(insn) && idx != subseq_idx - 1) {
+ /* exit from callback subprog to callback-calling helper or
+ * kfunc call. Use idx/subseq_idx check to discern it from
+ * straight line code backtracking.
+ * Unlike the subprog call handling above, we shouldn't
+ * propagate precision of r1-r5 (if any requested), as they are
+ * not actually arguments passed directly to callback subprogs
*/
if (bt_reg_mask(bt) & ~BPF_REGMASK_ARGS) {
verbose(env, "BUG regs %x\n", bt_reg_mask(bt));
@@ -3592,10 +3961,18 @@ static int backtrack_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx, int subseq_idx,
} else if (opcode == BPF_EXIT) {
bool r0_precise;
+ /* Backtracking to a nested function call, 'idx' is a part of
+ * the inner frame 'subseq_idx' is a part of the outer frame.
+ * In case of a regular function call, instructions giving
+ * precision to registers R1-R5 should have been found already.
+ * In case of a callback, it is ok to have R1-R5 marked for
+ * backtracking, as these registers are set by the function
+ * invoking callback.
+ */
+ if (subseq_idx >= 0 && calls_callback(env, subseq_idx))
+ for (i = BPF_REG_1; i <= BPF_REG_5; i++)
+ bt_clear_reg(bt, i);
if (bt_reg_mask(bt) & BPF_REGMASK_ARGS) {
- /* if backtracing was looking for registers R1-R5
- * they should have been found already.
- */
verbose(env, "BUG regs %x\n", bt_reg_mask(bt));
WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug");
return -EFAULT;
@@ -4039,11 +4416,9 @@ static int __mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno)
bitmap_from_u64(mask, bt_reg_mask(bt));
for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 32) {
reg = &st->frame[0]->regs[i];
- if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) {
- bt_clear_reg(bt, i);
- continue;
- }
- reg->precise = true;
+ bt_clear_reg(bt, i);
+ if (reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE)
+ reg->precise = true;
}
return 0;
}
@@ -4074,10 +4449,10 @@ static int __mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno)
* Nothing to be tracked further in the parent state.
*/
return 0;
- if (i == first_idx)
- break;
subseq_idx = i;
i = get_prev_insn_idx(st, i, &history);
+ if (i == -ENOENT)
+ break;
if (i >= env->prog->len) {
/* This can happen if backtracking reached insn 0
* and there are still reg_mask or stack_mask
@@ -4352,7 +4727,7 @@ static int check_stack_write_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
insn->imm != 0 && env->bpf_capable) {
struct bpf_reg_state fake_reg = {};
- __mark_reg_known(&fake_reg, (u32)insn->imm);
+ __mark_reg_known(&fake_reg, insn->imm);
fake_reg.type = SCALAR_VALUE;
save_register_state(state, spi, &fake_reg, size);
} else if (reg && is_spillable_regtype(reg->type)) {
@@ -4982,20 +5357,24 @@ static int map_kptr_match_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 regno)
{
const char *targ_name = btf_type_name(kptr_field->kptr.btf, kptr_field->kptr.btf_id);
- int perm_flags = PTR_MAYBE_NULL | PTR_TRUSTED | MEM_RCU;
+ int perm_flags;
const char *reg_name = "";
- /* Only unreferenced case accepts untrusted pointers */
- if (kptr_field->type == BPF_KPTR_UNREF)
- perm_flags |= PTR_UNTRUSTED;
+ if (btf_is_kernel(reg->btf)) {
+ perm_flags = PTR_MAYBE_NULL | PTR_TRUSTED | MEM_RCU;
+
+ /* Only unreferenced case accepts untrusted pointers */
+ if (kptr_field->type == BPF_KPTR_UNREF)
+ perm_flags |= PTR_UNTRUSTED;
+ } else {
+ perm_flags = PTR_MAYBE_NULL | MEM_ALLOC;
+ if (kptr_field->type == BPF_KPTR_PERCPU)
+ perm_flags |= MEM_PERCPU;
+ }
if (base_type(reg->type) != PTR_TO_BTF_ID || (type_flag(reg->type) & ~perm_flags))
goto bad_type;
- if (!btf_is_kernel(reg->btf)) {
- verbose(env, "R%d must point to kernel BTF\n", regno);
- return -EINVAL;
- }
/* We need to verify reg->type and reg->btf, before accessing reg->btf */
reg_name = btf_type_name(reg->btf, reg->btf_id);
@@ -5008,7 +5387,7 @@ static int map_kptr_match_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
if (__check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno, true))
return -EACCES;
- /* A full type match is needed, as BTF can be vmlinux or module BTF, and
+ /* A full type match is needed, as BTF can be vmlinux, module or prog BTF, and
* we also need to take into account the reg->off.
*
* We want to support cases like:
@@ -5034,7 +5413,7 @@ static int map_kptr_match_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
*/
if (!btf_struct_ids_match(&env->log, reg->btf, reg->btf_id, reg->off,
kptr_field->kptr.btf, kptr_field->kptr.btf_id,
- kptr_field->type == BPF_KPTR_REF))
+ kptr_field->type != BPF_KPTR_UNREF))
goto bad_type;
return 0;
bad_type:
@@ -5054,13 +5433,17 @@ bad_type:
*/
static bool in_rcu_cs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
{
- return env->cur_state->active_rcu_lock || !env->prog->aux->sleepable;
+ return env->cur_state->active_rcu_lock ||
+ env->cur_state->active_lock.ptr ||
+ !env->prog->aux->sleepable;
}
/* Once GCC supports btf_type_tag the following mechanism will be replaced with tag check */
BTF_SET_START(rcu_protected_types)
BTF_ID(struct, prog_test_ref_kfunc)
+#ifdef CONFIG_CGROUPS
BTF_ID(struct, cgroup)
+#endif
BTF_ID(struct, bpf_cpumask)
BTF_ID(struct, task_struct)
BTF_SET_END(rcu_protected_types)
@@ -5076,7 +5459,18 @@ static bool rcu_safe_kptr(const struct btf_field *field)
{
const struct btf_field_kptr *kptr = &field->kptr;
- return field->type == BPF_KPTR_REF && rcu_protected_object(kptr->btf, kptr->btf_id);
+ return field->type == BPF_KPTR_PERCPU ||
+ (field->type == BPF_KPTR_REF && rcu_protected_object(kptr->btf, kptr->btf_id));
+}
+
+static u32 btf_ld_kptr_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct btf_field *kptr_field)
+{
+ if (rcu_safe_kptr(kptr_field) && in_rcu_cs(env)) {
+ if (kptr_field->type != BPF_KPTR_PERCPU)
+ return PTR_MAYBE_NULL | MEM_RCU;
+ return PTR_MAYBE_NULL | MEM_RCU | MEM_PERCPU;
+ }
+ return PTR_MAYBE_NULL | PTR_UNTRUSTED;
}
static int check_map_kptr_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
@@ -5102,7 +5496,8 @@ static int check_map_kptr_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
/* We only allow loading referenced kptr, since it will be marked as
* untrusted, similar to unreferenced kptr.
*/
- if (class != BPF_LDX && kptr_field->type == BPF_KPTR_REF) {
+ if (class != BPF_LDX &&
+ (kptr_field->type == BPF_KPTR_REF || kptr_field->type == BPF_KPTR_PERCPU)) {
verbose(env, "store to referenced kptr disallowed\n");
return -EACCES;
}
@@ -5113,10 +5508,7 @@ static int check_map_kptr_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
* value from map as PTR_TO_BTF_ID, with the correct type.
*/
mark_btf_ld_reg(env, cur_regs(env), value_regno, PTR_TO_BTF_ID, kptr_field->kptr.btf,
- kptr_field->kptr.btf_id,
- rcu_safe_kptr(kptr_field) && in_rcu_cs(env) ?
- PTR_MAYBE_NULL | MEM_RCU :
- PTR_MAYBE_NULL | PTR_UNTRUSTED);
+ kptr_field->kptr.btf_id, btf_ld_kptr_type(env, kptr_field));
/* For mark_ptr_or_null_reg */
val_reg->id = ++env->id_gen;
} else if (class == BPF_STX) {
@@ -5170,6 +5562,7 @@ static int check_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
switch (field->type) {
case BPF_KPTR_UNREF:
case BPF_KPTR_REF:
+ case BPF_KPTR_PERCPU:
if (src != ACCESS_DIRECT) {
verbose(env, "kptr cannot be accessed indirectly by helper\n");
return -EACCES;
@@ -5412,12 +5805,25 @@ static bool is_flow_key_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno)
return reg->type == PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS;
}
+static u32 *reg2btf_ids[__BPF_REG_TYPE_MAX] = {
+#ifdef CONFIG_NET
+ [PTR_TO_SOCKET] = &btf_sock_ids[BTF_SOCK_TYPE_SOCK],
+ [PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON] = &btf_sock_ids[BTF_SOCK_TYPE_SOCK_COMMON],
+ [PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK] = &btf_sock_ids[BTF_SOCK_TYPE_TCP],
+#endif
+ [CONST_PTR_TO_MAP] = btf_bpf_map_id,
+};
+
static bool is_trusted_reg(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
{
/* A referenced register is always trusted. */
if (reg->ref_obj_id)
return true;
+ /* Types listed in the reg2btf_ids are always trusted */
+ if (reg2btf_ids[base_type(reg->type)])
+ return true;
+
/* If a register is not referenced, it is trusted if it has the
* MEM_ALLOC or PTR_TRUSTED type modifiers, and no others. Some of the
* other type modifiers may be safe, but we elect to take an opt-in
@@ -5624,6 +6030,27 @@ continue_func:
for (; i < subprog_end; i++) {
int next_insn, sidx;
+ if (bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(insn + i) && !insn[i].off) {
+ bool err = false;
+
+ if (!is_bpf_throw_kfunc(insn + i))
+ continue;
+ if (subprog[idx].is_cb)
+ err = true;
+ for (int c = 0; c < frame && !err; c++) {
+ if (subprog[ret_prog[c]].is_cb) {
+ err = true;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!err)
+ continue;
+ verbose(env,
+ "bpf_throw kfunc (insn %d) cannot be called from callback subprog %d\n",
+ i, idx);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn + i) && !bpf_pseudo_func(insn + i))
continue;
/* remember insn and function to return to */
@@ -5646,6 +6073,10 @@ continue_func:
/* async callbacks don't increase bpf prog stack size unless called directly */
if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn + i))
continue;
+ if (subprog[sidx].is_exception_cb) {
+ verbose(env, "insn %d cannot call exception cb directly\n", i);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
}
i = next_insn;
idx = sidx;
@@ -5667,8 +6098,13 @@ continue_func:
* tail call counter throughout bpf2bpf calls combined with tailcalls
*/
if (tail_call_reachable)
- for (j = 0; j < frame; j++)
+ for (j = 0; j < frame; j++) {
+ if (subprog[ret_prog[j]].is_exception_cb) {
+ verbose(env, "cannot tail call within exception cb\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
subprog[ret_prog[j]].tail_call_reachable = true;
+ }
if (subprog[0].tail_call_reachable)
env->prog->aux->tail_call_reachable = true;
@@ -5813,6 +6249,147 @@ static void coerce_reg_to_size(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int size)
__reg_combine_64_into_32(reg);
}
+static void set_sext64_default_val(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int size)
+{
+ if (size == 1) {
+ reg->smin_value = reg->s32_min_value = S8_MIN;
+ reg->smax_value = reg->s32_max_value = S8_MAX;
+ } else if (size == 2) {
+ reg->smin_value = reg->s32_min_value = S16_MIN;
+ reg->smax_value = reg->s32_max_value = S16_MAX;
+ } else {
+ /* size == 4 */
+ reg->smin_value = reg->s32_min_value = S32_MIN;
+ reg->smax_value = reg->s32_max_value = S32_MAX;
+ }
+ reg->umin_value = reg->u32_min_value = 0;
+ reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
+ reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX;
+ reg->var_off = tnum_unknown;
+}
+
+static void coerce_reg_to_size_sx(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int size)
+{
+ s64 init_s64_max, init_s64_min, s64_max, s64_min, u64_cval;
+ u64 top_smax_value, top_smin_value;
+ u64 num_bits = size * 8;
+
+ if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
+ u64_cval = reg->var_off.value;
+ if (size == 1)
+ reg->var_off = tnum_const((s8)u64_cval);
+ else if (size == 2)
+ reg->var_off = tnum_const((s16)u64_cval);
+ else
+ /* size == 4 */
+ reg->var_off = tnum_const((s32)u64_cval);
+
+ u64_cval = reg->var_off.value;
+ reg->smax_value = reg->smin_value = u64_cval;
+ reg->umax_value = reg->umin_value = u64_cval;
+ reg->s32_max_value = reg->s32_min_value = u64_cval;
+ reg->u32_max_value = reg->u32_min_value = u64_cval;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ top_smax_value = ((u64)reg->smax_value >> num_bits) << num_bits;
+ top_smin_value = ((u64)reg->smin_value >> num_bits) << num_bits;
+
+ if (top_smax_value != top_smin_value)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* find the s64_min and s64_min after sign extension */
+ if (size == 1) {
+ init_s64_max = (s8)reg->smax_value;
+ init_s64_min = (s8)reg->smin_value;
+ } else if (size == 2) {
+ init_s64_max = (s16)reg->smax_value;
+ init_s64_min = (s16)reg->smin_value;
+ } else {
+ init_s64_max = (s32)reg->smax_value;
+ init_s64_min = (s32)reg->smin_value;
+ }
+
+ s64_max = max(init_s64_max, init_s64_min);
+ s64_min = min(init_s64_max, init_s64_min);
+
+ /* both of s64_max/s64_min positive or negative */
+ if ((s64_max >= 0) == (s64_min >= 0)) {
+ reg->smin_value = reg->s32_min_value = s64_min;
+ reg->smax_value = reg->s32_max_value = s64_max;
+ reg->umin_value = reg->u32_min_value = s64_min;
+ reg->umax_value = reg->u32_max_value = s64_max;
+ reg->var_off = tnum_range(s64_min, s64_max);
+ return;
+ }
+
+out:
+ set_sext64_default_val(reg, size);
+}
+
+static void set_sext32_default_val(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int size)
+{
+ if (size == 1) {
+ reg->s32_min_value = S8_MIN;
+ reg->s32_max_value = S8_MAX;
+ } else {
+ /* size == 2 */
+ reg->s32_min_value = S16_MIN;
+ reg->s32_max_value = S16_MAX;
+ }
+ reg->u32_min_value = 0;
+ reg->u32_max_value = U32_MAX;
+}
+
+static void coerce_subreg_to_size_sx(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int size)
+{
+ s32 init_s32_max, init_s32_min, s32_max, s32_min, u32_val;
+ u32 top_smax_value, top_smin_value;
+ u32 num_bits = size * 8;
+
+ if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
+ u32_val = reg->var_off.value;
+ if (size == 1)
+ reg->var_off = tnum_const((s8)u32_val);
+ else
+ reg->var_off = tnum_const((s16)u32_val);
+
+ u32_val = reg->var_off.value;
+ reg->s32_min_value = reg->s32_max_value = u32_val;
+ reg->u32_min_value = reg->u32_max_value = u32_val;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ top_smax_value = ((u32)reg->s32_max_value >> num_bits) << num_bits;
+ top_smin_value = ((u32)reg->s32_min_value >> num_bits) << num_bits;
+
+ if (top_smax_value != top_smin_value)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* find the s32_min and s32_min after sign extension */
+ if (size == 1) {
+ init_s32_max = (s8)reg->s32_max_value;
+ init_s32_min = (s8)reg->s32_min_value;
+ } else {
+ /* size == 2 */
+ init_s32_max = (s16)reg->s32_max_value;
+ init_s32_min = (s16)reg->s32_min_value;
+ }
+ s32_max = max(init_s32_max, init_s32_min);
+ s32_min = min(init_s32_max, init_s32_min);
+
+ if ((s32_min >= 0) == (s32_max >= 0)) {
+ reg->s32_min_value = s32_min;
+ reg->s32_max_value = s32_max;
+ reg->u32_min_value = (u32)s32_min;
+ reg->u32_max_value = (u32)s32_max;
+ return;
+ }
+
+out:
+ set_sext32_default_val(reg, size);
+}
+
static bool bpf_map_is_rdonly(const struct bpf_map *map)
{
/* A map is considered read-only if the following condition are true:
@@ -5833,7 +6410,8 @@ static bool bpf_map_is_rdonly(const struct bpf_map *map)
!bpf_map_write_active(map);
}
-static int bpf_map_direct_read(struct bpf_map *map, int off, int size, u64 *val)
+static int bpf_map_direct_read(struct bpf_map *map, int off, int size, u64 *val,
+ bool is_ldsx)
{
void *ptr;
u64 addr;
@@ -5846,13 +6424,13 @@ static int bpf_map_direct_read(struct bpf_map *map, int off, int size, u64 *val)
switch (size) {
case sizeof(u8):
- *val = (u64)*(u8 *)ptr;
+ *val = is_ldsx ? (s64)*(s8 *)ptr : (u64)*(u8 *)ptr;
break;
case sizeof(u16):
- *val = (u64)*(u16 *)ptr;
+ *val = is_ldsx ? (s64)*(s16 *)ptr : (u64)*(u16 *)ptr;
break;
case sizeof(u32):
- *val = (u64)*(u32 *)ptr;
+ *val = is_ldsx ? (s64)*(s32 *)ptr : (u64)*(u32 *)ptr;
break;
case sizeof(u64):
*val = *(u64 *)ptr;
@@ -6042,7 +6620,7 @@ static int check_ptr_to_btf_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
}
if (type_is_alloc(reg->type) && !type_is_non_owning_ref(reg->type) &&
- !reg->ref_obj_id) {
+ !(reg->type & MEM_RCU) && !reg->ref_obj_id) {
verbose(env, "verifier internal error: ref_obj_id for allocated object must be non-zero\n");
return -EFAULT;
}
@@ -6085,6 +6663,11 @@ static int check_ptr_to_btf_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
type_is_rcu_or_null(env, reg, field_name, btf_id)) {
/* __rcu tagged pointers can be NULL */
flag |= MEM_RCU | PTR_MAYBE_NULL;
+
+ /* We always trust them */
+ if (type_is_rcu_or_null(env, reg, field_name, btf_id) &&
+ flag & PTR_UNTRUSTED)
+ flag &= ~PTR_UNTRUSTED;
} else if (flag & (MEM_PERCPU | MEM_USER)) {
/* keep as-is */
} else {
@@ -6266,7 +6849,7 @@ static int check_stack_access_within_bounds(
*/
static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regno,
int off, int bpf_size, enum bpf_access_type t,
- int value_regno, bool strict_alignment_once)
+ int value_regno, bool strict_alignment_once, bool is_ldsx)
{
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno;
@@ -6327,7 +6910,7 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regn
u64 val = 0;
err = bpf_map_direct_read(map, map_off, size,
- &val);
+ &val, is_ldsx);
if (err)
return err;
@@ -6497,8 +7080,11 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regn
if (!err && size < BPF_REG_SIZE && value_regno >= 0 && t == BPF_READ &&
regs[value_regno].type == SCALAR_VALUE) {
- /* b/h/w load zero-extends, mark upper bits as known 0 */
- coerce_reg_to_size(&regs[value_regno], size);
+ if (!is_ldsx)
+ /* b/h/w load zero-extends, mark upper bits as known 0 */
+ coerce_reg_to_size(&regs[value_regno], size);
+ else
+ coerce_reg_to_size_sx(&regs[value_regno], size);
}
return err;
}
@@ -6590,17 +7176,17 @@ static int check_atomic(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, struct bpf_i
* case to simulate the register fill.
*/
err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
- BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ, -1, true);
+ BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ, -1, true, false);
if (!err && load_reg >= 0)
err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ, load_reg,
- true);
+ true, false);
if (err)
return err;
/* Check whether we can write into the same memory. */
err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
- BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE, -1, true);
+ BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE, -1, true, false);
if (err)
return err;
@@ -6846,7 +7432,7 @@ static int check_helper_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
return zero_size_allowed ? 0 : -EACCES;
return check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, regno, offset, BPF_B,
- atype, -1, false);
+ atype, -1, false, false);
}
fallthrough;
@@ -7145,7 +7731,7 @@ static int process_kptr_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
verbose(env, "off=%d doesn't point to kptr\n", kptr_off);
return -EACCES;
}
- if (kptr_field->type != BPF_KPTR_REF) {
+ if (kptr_field->type != BPF_KPTR_REF && kptr_field->type != BPF_KPTR_PERCPU) {
verbose(env, "off=%d kptr isn't referenced kptr\n", kptr_off);
return -EACCES;
}
@@ -7218,7 +7804,7 @@ static int process_dynptr_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, int insn
/* we write BPF_DW bits (8 bytes) at a time */
for (i = 0; i < BPF_DYNPTR_SIZE; i += 8) {
err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, regno,
- i, BPF_DW, BPF_WRITE, -1, false);
+ i, BPF_DW, BPF_WRITE, -1, false, false);
if (err)
return err;
}
@@ -7311,20 +7897,29 @@ static int process_iter_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, int insn_id
for (i = 0; i < nr_slots * 8; i += BPF_REG_SIZE) {
err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, regno,
- i, BPF_DW, BPF_WRITE, -1, false);
+ i, BPF_DW, BPF_WRITE, -1, false, false);
if (err)
return err;
}
- err = mark_stack_slots_iter(env, reg, insn_idx, meta->btf, btf_id, nr_slots);
+ err = mark_stack_slots_iter(env, meta, reg, insn_idx, meta->btf, btf_id, nr_slots);
if (err)
return err;
} else {
/* iter_next() or iter_destroy() expect initialized iter state*/
- if (!is_iter_reg_valid_init(env, reg, meta->btf, btf_id, nr_slots)) {
+ err = is_iter_reg_valid_init(env, reg, meta->btf, btf_id, nr_slots);
+ switch (err) {
+ case 0:
+ break;
+ case -EINVAL:
verbose(env, "expected an initialized iter_%s as arg #%d\n",
iter_type_str(meta->btf, btf_id), regno);
- return -EINVAL;
+ return err;
+ case -EPROTO:
+ verbose(env, "expected an RCU CS when using %s\n", meta->func_name);
+ return err;
+ default:
+ return err;
}
spi = iter_get_spi(env, reg, nr_slots);
@@ -7350,6 +7945,81 @@ static int process_iter_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, int insn_id
return 0;
}
+/* Look for a previous loop entry at insn_idx: nearest parent state
+ * stopped at insn_idx with callsites matching those in cur->frame.
+ */
+static struct bpf_verifier_state *find_prev_entry(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+ struct bpf_verifier_state *cur,
+ int insn_idx)
+{
+ struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl;
+ struct bpf_verifier_state *st;
+
+ /* Explored states are pushed in stack order, most recent states come first */
+ sl = *explored_state(env, insn_idx);
+ for (; sl; sl = sl->next) {
+ /* If st->branches != 0 state is a part of current DFS verification path,
+ * hence cur & st for a loop.
+ */
+ st = &sl->state;
+ if (st->insn_idx == insn_idx && st->branches && same_callsites(st, cur) &&
+ st->dfs_depth < cur->dfs_depth)
+ return st;
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static void reset_idmap_scratch(struct bpf_verifier_env *env);
+static bool regs_exact(const struct bpf_reg_state *rold,
+ const struct bpf_reg_state *rcur,
+ struct bpf_idmap *idmap);
+
+static void maybe_widen_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+ struct bpf_reg_state *rold, struct bpf_reg_state *rcur,
+ struct bpf_idmap *idmap)
+{
+ if (rold->type != SCALAR_VALUE)
+ return;
+ if (rold->type != rcur->type)
+ return;
+ if (rold->precise || rcur->precise || regs_exact(rold, rcur, idmap))
+ return;
+ __mark_reg_unknown(env, rcur);
+}
+
+static int widen_imprecise_scalars(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+ struct bpf_verifier_state *old,
+ struct bpf_verifier_state *cur)
+{
+ struct bpf_func_state *fold, *fcur;
+ int i, fr;
+
+ reset_idmap_scratch(env);
+ for (fr = old->curframe; fr >= 0; fr--) {
+ fold = old->frame[fr];
+ fcur = cur->frame[fr];
+
+ for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++)
+ maybe_widen_reg(env,
+ &fold->regs[i],
+ &fcur->regs[i],
+ &env->idmap_scratch);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < fold->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; i++) {
+ if (!is_spilled_reg(&fold->stack[i]) ||
+ !is_spilled_reg(&fcur->stack[i]))
+ continue;
+
+ maybe_widen_reg(env,
+ &fold->stack[i].spilled_ptr,
+ &fcur->stack[i].spilled_ptr,
+ &env->idmap_scratch);
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
/* process_iter_next_call() is called when verifier gets to iterator's next
* "method" (e.g., bpf_iter_num_next() for numbers iterator) call. We'll refer
* to it as just "iter_next()" in comments below.
@@ -7391,25 +8061,47 @@ static int process_iter_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, int insn_id
* is some statically known limit on number of iterations (e.g., if there is
* an explicit `if n > 100 then break;` statement somewhere in the loop).
*
- * One very subtle but very important aspect is that we *always* simulate NULL
- * condition first (as the current state) before we simulate non-NULL case.
- * This has to do with intricacies of scalar precision tracking. By simulating
- * "exit condition" of iter_next() returning NULL first, we make sure all the
- * relevant precision marks *that will be set **after** we exit iterator loop*
- * are propagated backwards to common parent state of NULL and non-NULL
- * branches. Thanks to that, state equivalence checks done later in forked
- * state, when reaching iter_next() for ACTIVE iterator, can assume that
- * precision marks are finalized and won't change. Because simulating another
- * ACTIVE iterator iteration won't change them (because given same input
- * states we'll end up with exactly same output states which we are currently
- * comparing; and verification after the loop already propagated back what
- * needs to be **additionally** tracked as precise). It's subtle, grok
- * precision tracking for more intuitive understanding.
+ * Iteration convergence logic in is_state_visited() relies on exact
+ * states comparison, which ignores read and precision marks.
+ * This is necessary because read and precision marks are not finalized
+ * while in the loop. Exact comparison might preclude convergence for
+ * simple programs like below:
+ *
+ * i = 0;
+ * while(iter_next(&it))
+ * i++;
+ *
+ * At each iteration step i++ would produce a new distinct state and
+ * eventually instruction processing limit would be reached.
+ *
+ * To avoid such behavior speculatively forget (widen) range for
+ * imprecise scalar registers, if those registers were not precise at the
+ * end of the previous iteration and do not match exactly.
+ *
+ * This is a conservative heuristic that allows to verify wide range of programs,
+ * however it precludes verification of programs that conjure an
+ * imprecise value on the first loop iteration and use it as precise on a second.
+ * For example, the following safe program would fail to verify:
+ *
+ * struct bpf_num_iter it;
+ * int arr[10];
+ * int i = 0, a = 0;
+ * bpf_iter_num_new(&it, 0, 10);
+ * while (bpf_iter_num_next(&it)) {
+ * if (a == 0) {
+ * a = 1;
+ * i = 7; // Because i changed verifier would forget
+ * // it's range on second loop entry.
+ * } else {
+ * arr[i] = 42; // This would fail to verify.
+ * }
+ * }
+ * bpf_iter_num_destroy(&it);
*/
static int process_iter_next_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx,
struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta)
{
- struct bpf_verifier_state *cur_st = env->cur_state, *queued_st;
+ struct bpf_verifier_state *cur_st = env->cur_state, *queued_st, *prev_st;
struct bpf_func_state *cur_fr = cur_st->frame[cur_st->curframe], *queued_fr;
struct bpf_reg_state *cur_iter, *queued_iter;
int iter_frameno = meta->iter.frameno;
@@ -7427,6 +8119,19 @@ static int process_iter_next_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx,
}
if (cur_iter->iter.state == BPF_ITER_STATE_ACTIVE) {
+ /* Because iter_next() call is a checkpoint is_state_visitied()
+ * should guarantee parent state with same call sites and insn_idx.
+ */
+ if (!cur_st->parent || cur_st->parent->insn_idx != insn_idx ||
+ !same_callsites(cur_st->parent, cur_st)) {
+ verbose(env, "bug: bad parent state for iter next call");
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+ /* Note cur_st->parent in the call below, it is necessary to skip
+ * checkpoint created for cur_st by is_state_visited()
+ * right at this instruction.
+ */
+ prev_st = find_prev_entry(env, cur_st->parent, insn_idx);
/* branch out active iter state */
queued_st = push_stack(env, insn_idx + 1, insn_idx, false);
if (!queued_st)
@@ -7435,6 +8140,8 @@ static int process_iter_next_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx,
queued_iter = &queued_st->frame[iter_frameno]->stack[iter_spi].spilled_ptr;
queued_iter->iter.state = BPF_ITER_STATE_ACTIVE;
queued_iter->iter.depth++;
+ if (prev_st)
+ widen_imprecise_scalars(env, prev_st, queued_st);
queued_fr = queued_st->frame[queued_st->curframe];
mark_ptr_not_null_reg(&queued_fr->regs[BPF_REG_0]);
@@ -7578,6 +8285,7 @@ static const struct bpf_reg_types btf_ptr_types = {
static const struct bpf_reg_types percpu_btf_ptr_types = {
.types = {
PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_PERCPU,
+ PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_PERCPU | MEM_RCU,
PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_PERCPU | PTR_TRUSTED,
}
};
@@ -7656,8 +8364,10 @@ static int check_reg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
if (base_type(arg_type) == ARG_PTR_TO_MEM)
type &= ~DYNPTR_TYPE_FLAG_MASK;
- if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg && type_is_alloc(type))
+ if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg && type_is_alloc(type)) {
type &= ~MEM_ALLOC;
+ type &= ~MEM_PERCPU;
+ }
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(compatible->types); i++) {
expected = compatible->types[i];
@@ -7740,14 +8450,19 @@ found:
break;
}
case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC:
+ case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_PERCPU | MEM_ALLOC:
if (meta->func_id != BPF_FUNC_spin_lock && meta->func_id != BPF_FUNC_spin_unlock &&
meta->func_id != BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg) {
verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unimplemented handling of MEM_ALLOC\n");
return -EFAULT;
}
- /* Handled by helper specific checks */
+ if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg) {
+ if (map_kptr_match_type(env, meta->kptr_field, reg, regno))
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
break;
case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_PERCPU:
+ case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_PERCPU | MEM_RCU:
case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_PERCPU | PTR_TRUSTED:
/* Handled by helper specific checks */
break;
@@ -7797,17 +8512,6 @@ int check_func_arg_reg_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
if (arg_type_is_dynptr(arg_type) && type == PTR_TO_STACK)
return 0;
- if ((type_is_ptr_alloc_obj(type) || type_is_non_owning_ref(type)) && reg->off) {
- if (reg_find_field_offset(reg, reg->off, BPF_GRAPH_NODE_OR_ROOT))
- return __check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno, true);
-
- verbose(env, "R%d must have zero offset when passed to release func\n",
- regno);
- verbose(env, "No graph node or root found at R%d type:%s off:%d\n", regno,
- btf_type_name(reg->btf, reg->btf_id), reg->off);
- return -EINVAL;
- }
-
/* Doing check_ptr_off_reg check for the offset will catch this
* because fixed_off_ok is false, but checking here allows us
* to give the user a better error message.
@@ -7842,6 +8546,7 @@ int check_func_arg_reg_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED:
case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_RCU:
case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC | NON_OWN_REF:
+ case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC | NON_OWN_REF | MEM_RCU:
/* When referenced PTR_TO_BTF_ID is passed to release function,
* its fixed offset must be 0. In the other cases, fixed offset
* can be non-zero. This was already checked above. So pass
@@ -8671,7 +9376,7 @@ static void clear_caller_saved_regs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
/* after the call registers r0 - r5 were scratched */
for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) {
mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, caller_saved[i]);
- check_reg_arg(env, caller_saved[i], DST_OP_NO_MARK);
+ __check_reg_arg(env, regs, caller_saved[i], DST_OP_NO_MARK);
}
}
@@ -8684,11 +9389,10 @@ static int set_callee_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_func_state *caller,
struct bpf_func_state *callee, int insn_idx);
-static int __check_func_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,
- int *insn_idx, int subprog,
- set_callee_state_fn set_callee_state_cb)
+static int setup_func_entry(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog, int callsite,
+ set_callee_state_fn set_callee_state_cb,
+ struct bpf_verifier_state *state)
{
- struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state;
struct bpf_func_state *caller, *callee;
int err;
@@ -8698,53 +9402,72 @@ static int __check_func_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn
return -E2BIG;
}
- caller = state->frame[state->curframe];
if (state->frame[state->curframe + 1]) {
verbose(env, "verifier bug. Frame %d already allocated\n",
state->curframe + 1);
return -EFAULT;
}
+ caller = state->frame[state->curframe];
+ callee = kzalloc(sizeof(*callee), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!callee)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ state->frame[state->curframe + 1] = callee;
+
+ /* callee cannot access r0, r6 - r9 for reading and has to write
+ * into its own stack before reading from it.
+ * callee can read/write into caller's stack
+ */
+ init_func_state(env, callee,
+ /* remember the callsite, it will be used by bpf_exit */
+ callsite,
+ state->curframe + 1 /* frameno within this callchain */,
+ subprog /* subprog number within this prog */);
+ /* Transfer references to the callee */
+ err = copy_reference_state(callee, caller);
+ err = err ?: set_callee_state_cb(env, caller, callee, callsite);
+ if (err)
+ goto err_out;
+
+ /* only increment it after check_reg_arg() finished */
+ state->curframe++;
+
+ return 0;
+
+err_out:
+ free_func_state(callee);
+ state->frame[state->curframe + 1] = NULL;
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int push_callback_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,
+ int insn_idx, int subprog,
+ set_callee_state_fn set_callee_state_cb)
+{
+ struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state, *callback_state;
+ struct bpf_func_state *caller, *callee;
+ int err;
+
+ caller = state->frame[state->curframe];
err = btf_check_subprog_call(env, subprog, caller->regs);
if (err == -EFAULT)
return err;
- if (subprog_is_global(env, subprog)) {
- if (err) {
- verbose(env, "Caller passes invalid args into func#%d\n",
- subprog);
- return err;
- } else {
- if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL)
- verbose(env,
- "Func#%d is global and valid. Skipping.\n",
- subprog);
- clear_caller_saved_regs(env, caller->regs);
-
- /* All global functions return a 64-bit SCALAR_VALUE */
- mark_reg_unknown(env, caller->regs, BPF_REG_0);
- caller->regs[BPF_REG_0].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG;
-
- /* continue with next insn after call */
- return 0;
- }
- }
/* set_callee_state is used for direct subprog calls, but we are
* interested in validating only BPF helpers that can call subprogs as
* callbacks
*/
- if (set_callee_state_cb != set_callee_state) {
- if (bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(insn) &&
- !is_callback_calling_kfunc(insn->imm)) {
- verbose(env, "verifier bug: kfunc %s#%d not marked as callback-calling\n",
- func_id_name(insn->imm), insn->imm);
- return -EFAULT;
- } else if (!bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(insn) &&
- !is_callback_calling_function(insn->imm)) { /* helper */
- verbose(env, "verifier bug: helper %s#%d not marked as callback-calling\n",
- func_id_name(insn->imm), insn->imm);
- return -EFAULT;
- }
+ env->subprog_info[subprog].is_cb = true;
+ if (bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(insn) &&
+ !is_sync_callback_calling_kfunc(insn->imm)) {
+ verbose(env, "verifier bug: kfunc %s#%d not marked as callback-calling\n",
+ func_id_name(insn->imm), insn->imm);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ } else if (!bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(insn) &&
+ !is_callback_calling_function(insn->imm)) { /* helper */
+ verbose(env, "verifier bug: helper %s#%d not marked as callback-calling\n",
+ func_id_name(insn->imm), insn->imm);
+ return -EFAULT;
}
if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) &&
@@ -8755,53 +9478,83 @@ static int __check_func_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn
/* there is no real recursion here. timer callbacks are async */
env->subprog_info[subprog].is_async_cb = true;
async_cb = push_async_cb(env, env->subprog_info[subprog].start,
- *insn_idx, subprog);
+ insn_idx, subprog);
if (!async_cb)
return -EFAULT;
callee = async_cb->frame[0];
callee->async_entry_cnt = caller->async_entry_cnt + 1;
/* Convert bpf_timer_set_callback() args into timer callback args */
- err = set_callee_state_cb(env, caller, callee, *insn_idx);
+ err = set_callee_state_cb(env, caller, callee, insn_idx);
if (err)
return err;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* for callback functions enqueue entry to callback and
+ * proceed with next instruction within current frame.
+ */
+ callback_state = push_stack(env, env->subprog_info[subprog].start, insn_idx, false);
+ if (!callback_state)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ err = setup_func_entry(env, subprog, insn_idx, set_callee_state_cb,
+ callback_state);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ callback_state->callback_unroll_depth++;
+ callback_state->frame[callback_state->curframe - 1]->callback_depth++;
+ caller->callback_depth = 0;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int check_func_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,
+ int *insn_idx)
+{
+ struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state;
+ struct bpf_func_state *caller;
+ int err, subprog, target_insn;
+
+ target_insn = *insn_idx + insn->imm + 1;
+ subprog = find_subprog(env, target_insn);
+ if (subprog < 0) {
+ verbose(env, "verifier bug. No program starts at insn %d\n", target_insn);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+
+ caller = state->frame[state->curframe];
+ err = btf_check_subprog_call(env, subprog, caller->regs);
+ if (err == -EFAULT)
+ return err;
+ if (subprog_is_global(env, subprog)) {
+ if (err) {
+ verbose(env, "Caller passes invalid args into func#%d\n", subprog);
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL)
+ verbose(env, "Func#%d is global and valid. Skipping.\n", subprog);
clear_caller_saved_regs(env, caller->regs);
+
+ /* All global functions return a 64-bit SCALAR_VALUE */
mark_reg_unknown(env, caller->regs, BPF_REG_0);
caller->regs[BPF_REG_0].subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG;
+
/* continue with next insn after call */
return 0;
}
- callee = kzalloc(sizeof(*callee), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!callee)
- return -ENOMEM;
- state->frame[state->curframe + 1] = callee;
-
- /* callee cannot access r0, r6 - r9 for reading and has to write
- * into its own stack before reading from it.
- * callee can read/write into caller's stack
+ /* for regular function entry setup new frame and continue
+ * from that frame.
*/
- init_func_state(env, callee,
- /* remember the callsite, it will be used by bpf_exit */
- *insn_idx /* callsite */,
- state->curframe + 1 /* frameno within this callchain */,
- subprog /* subprog number within this prog */);
-
- /* Transfer references to the callee */
- err = copy_reference_state(callee, caller);
+ err = setup_func_entry(env, subprog, *insn_idx, set_callee_state, state);
if (err)
- goto err_out;
-
- err = set_callee_state_cb(env, caller, callee, *insn_idx);
- if (err)
- goto err_out;
+ return err;
clear_caller_saved_regs(env, caller->regs);
- /* only increment it after check_reg_arg() finished */
- state->curframe++;
-
/* and go analyze first insn of the callee */
*insn_idx = env->subprog_info[subprog].start - 1;
@@ -8809,14 +9562,10 @@ static int __check_func_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn
verbose(env, "caller:\n");
print_verifier_state(env, caller, true);
verbose(env, "callee:\n");
- print_verifier_state(env, callee, true);
+ print_verifier_state(env, state->frame[state->curframe], true);
}
- return 0;
-err_out:
- free_func_state(callee);
- state->frame[state->curframe + 1] = NULL;
- return err;
+ return 0;
}
int map_set_for_each_callback_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
@@ -8860,22 +9609,6 @@ static int set_callee_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
return 0;
}
-static int check_func_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,
- int *insn_idx)
-{
- int subprog, target_insn;
-
- target_insn = *insn_idx + insn->imm + 1;
- subprog = find_subprog(env, target_insn);
- if (subprog < 0) {
- verbose(env, "verifier bug. No program starts at insn %d\n",
- target_insn);
- return -EFAULT;
- }
-
- return __check_func_call(env, insn, insn_idx, subprog, set_callee_state);
-}
-
static int set_map_elem_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_func_state *caller,
struct bpf_func_state *callee,
@@ -9068,9 +9801,10 @@ static bool in_rbtree_lock_required_cb(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
static int prepare_func_exit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int *insn_idx)
{
- struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state;
+ struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state, *prev_st;
struct bpf_func_state *caller, *callee;
struct bpf_reg_state *r0;
+ bool in_callback_fn;
int err;
callee = state->frame[state->curframe];
@@ -9099,6 +9833,11 @@ static int prepare_func_exit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int *insn_idx)
verbose_invalid_scalar(env, r0, &range, "callback return", "R0");
return -EINVAL;
}
+ if (!calls_callback(env, callee->callsite)) {
+ verbose(env, "BUG: in callback at %d, callsite %d !calls_callback\n",
+ *insn_idx, callee->callsite);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
} else {
/* return to the caller whatever r0 had in the callee */
caller->regs[BPF_REG_0] = *r0;
@@ -9116,16 +9855,44 @@ static int prepare_func_exit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int *insn_idx)
return err;
}
- *insn_idx = callee->callsite + 1;
+ /* for callbacks like bpf_loop or bpf_for_each_map_elem go back to callsite,
+ * there function call logic would reschedule callback visit. If iteration
+ * converges is_state_visited() would prune that visit eventually.
+ */
+ in_callback_fn = callee->in_callback_fn;
+ if (in_callback_fn)
+ *insn_idx = callee->callsite;
+ else
+ *insn_idx = callee->callsite + 1;
+
if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) {
verbose(env, "returning from callee:\n");
print_verifier_state(env, callee, true);
verbose(env, "to caller at %d:\n", *insn_idx);
print_verifier_state(env, caller, true);
}
- /* clear everything in the callee */
+ /* clear everything in the callee. In case of exceptional exits using
+ * bpf_throw, this will be done by copy_verifier_state for extra frames. */
free_func_state(callee);
state->frame[state->curframe--] = NULL;
+
+ /* for callbacks widen imprecise scalars to make programs like below verify:
+ *
+ * struct ctx { int i; }
+ * void cb(int idx, struct ctx *ctx) { ctx->i++; ... }
+ * ...
+ * struct ctx = { .i = 0; }
+ * bpf_loop(100, cb, &ctx, 0);
+ *
+ * This is similar to what is done in process_iter_next_call() for open
+ * coded iterators.
+ */
+ prev_st = in_callback_fn ? find_prev_entry(env, state, *insn_idx) : NULL;
+ if (prev_st) {
+ err = widen_imprecise_scalars(env, prev_st, state);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
return 0;
}
@@ -9135,19 +9902,33 @@ static void do_refine_retval_range(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, int ret_type,
{
struct bpf_reg_state *ret_reg = &regs[BPF_REG_0];
- if (ret_type != RET_INTEGER ||
- (func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_stack &&
- func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_task_stack &&
- func_id != BPF_FUNC_probe_read_str &&
- func_id != BPF_FUNC_probe_read_kernel_str &&
- func_id != BPF_FUNC_probe_read_user_str))
+ if (ret_type != RET_INTEGER)
return;
- ret_reg->smax_value = meta->msize_max_value;
- ret_reg->s32_max_value = meta->msize_max_value;
- ret_reg->smin_value = -MAX_ERRNO;
- ret_reg->s32_min_value = -MAX_ERRNO;
- reg_bounds_sync(ret_reg);
+ switch (func_id) {
+ case BPF_FUNC_get_stack:
+ case BPF_FUNC_get_task_stack:
+ case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_str:
+ case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_kernel_str:
+ case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_user_str:
+ ret_reg->smax_value = meta->msize_max_value;
+ ret_reg->s32_max_value = meta->msize_max_value;
+ ret_reg->smin_value = -MAX_ERRNO;
+ ret_reg->s32_min_value = -MAX_ERRNO;
+ reg_bounds_sync(ret_reg);
+ break;
+ case BPF_FUNC_get_smp_processor_id:
+ ret_reg->umax_value = nr_cpu_ids - 1;
+ ret_reg->u32_max_value = nr_cpu_ids - 1;
+ ret_reg->smax_value = nr_cpu_ids - 1;
+ ret_reg->s32_max_value = nr_cpu_ids - 1;
+ ret_reg->umin_value = 0;
+ ret_reg->u32_min_value = 0;
+ ret_reg->smin_value = 0;
+ ret_reg->s32_min_value = 0;
+ reg_bounds_sync(ret_reg);
+ break;
+ }
}
static int
@@ -9233,17 +10014,17 @@ record_func_key(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta,
return 0;
}
-static int check_reference_leak(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
+static int check_reference_leak(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, bool exception_exit)
{
struct bpf_func_state *state = cur_func(env);
bool refs_lingering = false;
int i;
- if (state->frameno && !state->in_callback_fn)
+ if (!exception_exit && state->frameno && !state->in_callback_fn)
return 0;
for (i = 0; i < state->acquired_refs; i++) {
- if (state->in_callback_fn && state->refs[i].callback_ref != state->frameno)
+ if (!exception_exit && state->in_callback_fn && state->refs[i].callback_ref != state->frameno)
continue;
verbose(env, "Unreleased reference id=%d alloc_insn=%d\n",
state->refs[i].id, state->refs[i].insn_idx);
@@ -9350,6 +10131,7 @@ static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn
int *insn_idx_p)
{
enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog);
+ bool returns_cpu_specific_alloc_ptr = false;
const struct bpf_func_proto *fn = NULL;
enum bpf_return_type ret_type;
enum bpf_type_flag ret_flag;
@@ -9441,7 +10223,7 @@ static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn
*/
for (i = 0; i < meta.access_size; i++) {
err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, meta.regno, i, BPF_B,
- BPF_WRITE, -1, false);
+ BPF_WRITE, -1, false, false);
if (err)
return err;
}
@@ -9460,6 +10242,26 @@ static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn
return -EFAULT;
}
err = unmark_stack_slots_dynptr(env, &regs[meta.release_regno]);
+ } else if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg && meta.ref_obj_id) {
+ u32 ref_obj_id = meta.ref_obj_id;
+ bool in_rcu = in_rcu_cs(env);
+ struct bpf_func_state *state;
+ struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
+
+ err = release_reference_state(cur_func(env), ref_obj_id);
+ if (!err) {
+ bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(env->cur_state, state, reg, ({
+ if (reg->ref_obj_id == ref_obj_id) {
+ if (in_rcu && (reg->type & MEM_ALLOC) && (reg->type & MEM_PERCPU)) {
+ reg->ref_obj_id = 0;
+ reg->type &= ~MEM_ALLOC;
+ reg->type |= MEM_RCU;
+ } else {
+ mark_reg_invalid(env, reg);
+ }
+ }
+ }));
+ }
} else if (meta.ref_obj_id) {
err = release_reference(env, meta.ref_obj_id);
} else if (register_is_null(&regs[meta.release_regno])) {
@@ -9477,7 +10279,7 @@ static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn
switch (func_id) {
case BPF_FUNC_tail_call:
- err = check_reference_leak(env);
+ err = check_reference_leak(env, false);
if (err) {
verbose(env, "tail_call would lead to reference leak\n");
return err;
@@ -9493,24 +10295,37 @@ static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn
}
break;
case BPF_FUNC_for_each_map_elem:
- err = __check_func_call(env, insn, insn_idx_p, meta.subprogno,
- set_map_elem_callback_state);
+ err = push_callback_call(env, insn, insn_idx, meta.subprogno,
+ set_map_elem_callback_state);
break;
case BPF_FUNC_timer_set_callback:
- err = __check_func_call(env, insn, insn_idx_p, meta.subprogno,
- set_timer_callback_state);
+ err = push_callback_call(env, insn, insn_idx, meta.subprogno,
+ set_timer_callback_state);
break;
case BPF_FUNC_find_vma:
- err = __check_func_call(env, insn, insn_idx_p, meta.subprogno,
- set_find_vma_callback_state);
+ err = push_callback_call(env, insn, insn_idx, meta.subprogno,
+ set_find_vma_callback_state);
break;
case BPF_FUNC_snprintf:
err = check_bpf_snprintf_call(env, regs);
break;
case BPF_FUNC_loop:
update_loop_inline_state(env, meta.subprogno);
- err = __check_func_call(env, insn, insn_idx_p, meta.subprogno,
- set_loop_callback_state);
+ /* Verifier relies on R1 value to determine if bpf_loop() iteration
+ * is finished, thus mark it precise.
+ */
+ err = mark_chain_precision(env, BPF_REG_1);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ if (cur_func(env)->callback_depth < regs[BPF_REG_1].umax_value) {
+ err = push_callback_call(env, insn, insn_idx, meta.subprogno,
+ set_loop_callback_state);
+ } else {
+ cur_func(env)->callback_depth = 0;
+ if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2)
+ verbose(env, "frame%d bpf_loop iteration limit reached\n",
+ env->cur_state->curframe);
+ }
break;
case BPF_FUNC_dynptr_from_mem:
if (regs[BPF_REG_1].type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) {
@@ -9588,9 +10403,26 @@ static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn
break;
}
+ case BPF_FUNC_per_cpu_ptr:
+ case BPF_FUNC_this_cpu_ptr:
+ {
+ struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &regs[BPF_REG_1];
+ const struct btf_type *type;
+
+ if (reg->type & MEM_RCU) {
+ type = btf_type_by_id(reg->btf, reg->btf_id);
+ if (!type || !btf_type_is_struct(type)) {
+ verbose(env, "Helper has invalid btf/btf_id in R1\n");
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+ returns_cpu_specific_alloc_ptr = true;
+ env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].call_with_percpu_alloc_ptr = true;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
case BPF_FUNC_user_ringbuf_drain:
- err = __check_func_call(env, insn, insn_idx_p, meta.subprogno,
- set_user_ringbuf_callback_state);
+ err = push_callback_call(env, insn, insn_idx, meta.subprogno,
+ set_user_ringbuf_callback_state);
break;
}
@@ -9677,14 +10509,18 @@ static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn
regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MEM | ret_flag;
regs[BPF_REG_0].mem_size = tsize;
} else {
- /* MEM_RDONLY may be carried from ret_flag, but it
- * doesn't apply on PTR_TO_BTF_ID. Fold it, otherwise
- * it will confuse the check of PTR_TO_BTF_ID in
- * check_mem_access().
- */
- ret_flag &= ~MEM_RDONLY;
+ if (returns_cpu_specific_alloc_ptr) {
+ regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC | MEM_RCU;
+ } else {
+ /* MEM_RDONLY may be carried from ret_flag, but it
+ * doesn't apply on PTR_TO_BTF_ID. Fold it, otherwise
+ * it will confuse the check of PTR_TO_BTF_ID in
+ * check_mem_access().
+ */
+ ret_flag &= ~MEM_RDONLY;
+ regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | ret_flag;
+ }
- regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | ret_flag;
regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = meta.ret_btf;
regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = meta.ret_btf_id;
}
@@ -9700,8 +10536,11 @@ static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn
if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg) {
ret_btf = meta.kptr_field->kptr.btf;
ret_btf_id = meta.kptr_field->kptr.btf_id;
- if (!btf_is_kernel(ret_btf))
+ if (!btf_is_kernel(ret_btf)) {
regs[BPF_REG_0].type |= MEM_ALLOC;
+ if (meta.kptr_field->type == BPF_KPTR_PERCPU)
+ regs[BPF_REG_0].type |= MEM_PERCPU;
+ }
} else {
if (fn->ret_btf_id == BPF_PTR_POISON) {
verbose(env, "verifier internal error:");
@@ -9848,6 +10687,11 @@ static bool is_kfunc_rcu(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta)
return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_RCU;
}
+static bool is_kfunc_rcu_protected(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta)
+{
+ return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_RCU_PROTECTED;
+}
+
static bool __kfunc_param_match_suffix(const struct btf *btf,
const struct btf_param *arg,
const char *suffix)
@@ -9922,6 +10766,11 @@ static bool is_kfunc_arg_refcounted_kptr(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf
return __kfunc_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__refcounted_kptr");
}
+static bool is_kfunc_arg_nullable(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg)
+{
+ return __kfunc_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, "__nullable");
+}
+
static bool is_kfunc_arg_scalar_with_name(const struct btf *btf,
const struct btf_param *arg,
const char *name)
@@ -10050,15 +10899,6 @@ static bool __btf_type_is_scalar_struct(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
return true;
}
-
-static u32 *reg2btf_ids[__BPF_REG_TYPE_MAX] = {
-#ifdef CONFIG_NET
- [PTR_TO_SOCKET] = &btf_sock_ids[BTF_SOCK_TYPE_SOCK],
- [PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON] = &btf_sock_ids[BTF_SOCK_TYPE_SOCK_COMMON],
- [PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK] = &btf_sock_ids[BTF_SOCK_TYPE_TCP],
-#endif
-};
-
enum kfunc_ptr_arg_type {
KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CTX,
KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_BTF_ID, /* Allocated object */
@@ -10073,6 +10913,7 @@ enum kfunc_ptr_arg_type {
KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CALLBACK,
KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RB_ROOT,
KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RB_NODE,
+ KF_ARG_PTR_TO_NULL,
};
enum special_kfunc_type {
@@ -10095,6 +10936,10 @@ enum special_kfunc_type {
KF_bpf_dynptr_slice,
KF_bpf_dynptr_slice_rdwr,
KF_bpf_dynptr_clone,
+ KF_bpf_percpu_obj_new_impl,
+ KF_bpf_percpu_obj_drop_impl,
+ KF_bpf_throw,
+ KF_bpf_iter_css_task_new,
};
BTF_SET_START(special_kfunc_set)
@@ -10115,6 +10960,12 @@ BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_from_xdp)
BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_slice)
BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_slice_rdwr)
BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_clone)
+BTF_ID(func, bpf_percpu_obj_new_impl)
+BTF_ID(func, bpf_percpu_obj_drop_impl)
+BTF_ID(func, bpf_throw)
+#ifdef CONFIG_CGROUPS
+BTF_ID(func, bpf_iter_css_task_new)
+#endif
BTF_SET_END(special_kfunc_set)
BTF_ID_LIST(special_kfunc_list)
@@ -10137,6 +10988,14 @@ BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_from_xdp)
BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_slice)
BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_slice_rdwr)
BTF_ID(func, bpf_dynptr_clone)
+BTF_ID(func, bpf_percpu_obj_new_impl)
+BTF_ID(func, bpf_percpu_obj_drop_impl)
+BTF_ID(func, bpf_throw)
+#ifdef CONFIG_CGROUPS
+BTF_ID(func, bpf_iter_css_task_new)
+#else
+BTF_ID_UNUSED
+#endif
static bool is_kfunc_ret_null(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta)
{
@@ -10217,6 +11076,8 @@ get_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
if (is_kfunc_arg_callback(env, meta->btf, &args[argno]))
return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CALLBACK;
+ if (is_kfunc_arg_nullable(meta->btf, &args[argno]) && register_is_null(reg))
+ return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_NULL;
if (argno + 1 < nargs &&
(is_kfunc_arg_mem_size(meta->btf, &args[argno + 1], &regs[regno + 1]) ||
@@ -10303,6 +11164,7 @@ static int process_kf_arg_ptr_to_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
static int ref_set_non_owning(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
{
struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state;
+ struct btf_record *rec = reg_btf_record(reg);
if (!state->active_lock.ptr) {
verbose(env, "verifier internal error: ref_set_non_owning w/o active lock\n");
@@ -10315,6 +11177,9 @@ static int ref_set_non_owning(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state
}
reg->type |= NON_OWN_REF;
+ if (rec->refcount_off >= 0)
+ reg->type |= MEM_RCU;
+
return 0;
}
@@ -10445,11 +11310,17 @@ static bool is_bpf_graph_api_kfunc(u32 btf_id)
btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_refcount_acquire_impl];
}
-static bool is_callback_calling_kfunc(u32 btf_id)
+static bool is_sync_callback_calling_kfunc(u32 btf_id)
{
return btf_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_add_impl];
}
+static bool is_bpf_throw_kfunc(struct bpf_insn *insn)
+{
+ return bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(insn) && insn->off == 0 &&
+ insn->imm == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_throw];
+}
+
static bool is_rbtree_lock_required_kfunc(u32 btf_id)
{
return is_bpf_rbtree_api_kfunc(btf_id);
@@ -10657,6 +11528,28 @@ static int process_kf_arg_ptr_to_rbtree_node(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
&meta->arg_rbtree_root.field);
}
+/*
+ * css_task iter allowlist is needed to avoid dead locking on css_set_lock.
+ * LSM hooks and iters (both sleepable and non-sleepable) are safe.
+ * Any sleepable progs are also safe since bpf_check_attach_target() enforce
+ * them can only be attached to some specific hook points.
+ */
+static bool check_css_task_iter_allowlist(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
+{
+ enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog);
+
+ switch (prog_type) {
+ case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM:
+ return true;
+ case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING:
+ if (env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_ITER)
+ return true;
+ fallthrough;
+ default:
+ return env->prog->aux->sleepable;
+ }
+}
+
static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta,
int insn_idx)
{
@@ -10743,7 +11636,8 @@ static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_
}
if ((is_kfunc_trusted_args(meta) || is_kfunc_rcu(meta)) &&
- (register_is_null(reg) || type_may_be_null(reg->type))) {
+ (register_is_null(reg) || type_may_be_null(reg->type)) &&
+ !is_kfunc_arg_nullable(meta->btf, &args[i])) {
verbose(env, "Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted arg%d\n", i);
return -EACCES;
}
@@ -10768,6 +11662,8 @@ static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_
return kf_arg_type;
switch (kf_arg_type) {
+ case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_NULL:
+ continue;
case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_BTF_ID:
case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID:
if (!is_kfunc_trusted_args(meta) && !is_kfunc_rcu(meta))
@@ -10827,7 +11723,17 @@ static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_
}
break;
case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_BTF_ID:
- if (reg->type != (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC)) {
+ if (reg->type == (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC)) {
+ if (meta->func_id != special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_drop_impl]) {
+ verbose(env, "arg#%d expected for bpf_obj_drop_impl()\n", i);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ } else if (reg->type == (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC | MEM_PERCPU)) {
+ if (meta->func_id != special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_percpu_obj_drop_impl]) {
+ verbose(env, "arg#%d expected for bpf_percpu_obj_drop_impl()\n", i);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ } else {
verbose(env, "arg#%d expected pointer to allocated object\n", i);
return -EINVAL;
}
@@ -10835,8 +11741,7 @@ static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_
verbose(env, "allocated object must be referenced\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
- if (meta->btf == btf_vmlinux &&
- meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_drop_impl]) {
+ if (meta->btf == btf_vmlinux) {
meta->arg_btf = reg->btf;
meta->arg_btf_id = reg->btf_id;
}
@@ -10898,6 +11803,12 @@ static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_
break;
}
case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ITER:
+ if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_iter_css_task_new]) {
+ if (!check_css_task_iter_allowlist(env)) {
+ verbose(env, "css_task_iter is only allowed in bpf_lsm, bpf_iter and sleepable progs\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
ret = process_iter_arg(env, regno, insn_idx, meta);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
@@ -11027,6 +11938,10 @@ static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_
break;
}
case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CALLBACK:
+ if (reg->type != PTR_TO_FUNC) {
+ verbose(env, "arg%d expected pointer to func\n", i);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
meta->subprogno = reg->subprogno;
break;
case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_REFCOUNTED_KPTR:
@@ -11047,10 +11962,7 @@ static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_
verbose(env, "arg#%d doesn't point to a type with bpf_refcount field\n", i);
return -EINVAL;
}
- if (rec->refcount_off >= 0) {
- verbose(env, "bpf_refcount_acquire calls are disabled for now\n");
- return -EINVAL;
- }
+
meta->arg_btf = reg->btf;
meta->arg_btf_id = reg->btf_id;
break;
@@ -11108,6 +12020,8 @@ static int fetch_kfunc_meta(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
return 0;
}
+static int check_return_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno);
+
static int check_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,
int *insn_idx_p)
{
@@ -11148,18 +12062,39 @@ static int check_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,
return -EACCES;
}
+ /* Check the arguments */
+ err = check_kfunc_args(env, &meta, insn_idx);
+ if (err < 0)
+ return err;
+
+ if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_add_impl]) {
+ err = push_callback_call(env, insn, insn_idx, meta.subprogno,
+ set_rbtree_add_callback_state);
+ if (err) {
+ verbose(env, "kfunc %s#%d failed callback verification\n",
+ func_name, meta.func_id);
+ return err;
+ }
+ }
+
rcu_lock = is_kfunc_bpf_rcu_read_lock(&meta);
rcu_unlock = is_kfunc_bpf_rcu_read_unlock(&meta);
if (env->cur_state->active_rcu_lock) {
struct bpf_func_state *state;
struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
+ u32 clear_mask = (1 << STACK_SPILL) | (1 << STACK_ITER);
+
+ if (in_rbtree_lock_required_cb(env) && (rcu_lock || rcu_unlock)) {
+ verbose(env, "Calling bpf_rcu_read_{lock,unlock} in unnecessary rbtree callback\n");
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
if (rcu_lock) {
verbose(env, "nested rcu read lock (kernel function %s)\n", func_name);
return -EINVAL;
} else if (rcu_unlock) {
- bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(env->cur_state, state, reg, ({
+ bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate_mask(env->cur_state, state, reg, clear_mask, ({
if (reg->type & MEM_RCU) {
reg->type &= ~(MEM_RCU | PTR_MAYBE_NULL);
reg->type |= PTR_UNTRUSTED;
@@ -11177,10 +12112,6 @@ static int check_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,
return -EINVAL;
}
- /* Check the arguments */
- err = check_kfunc_args(env, &meta, insn_idx);
- if (err < 0)
- return err;
/* In case of release function, we get register number of refcounted
* PTR_TO_BTF_ID in bpf_kfunc_arg_meta, do the release now.
*/
@@ -11214,13 +12145,21 @@ static int check_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,
}
}
- if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_add_impl]) {
- err = __check_func_call(env, insn, insn_idx_p, meta.subprogno,
- set_rbtree_add_callback_state);
- if (err) {
- verbose(env, "kfunc %s#%d failed callback verification\n",
+ if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_throw]) {
+ if (!bpf_jit_supports_exceptions()) {
+ verbose(env, "JIT does not support calling kfunc %s#%d\n",
func_name, meta.func_id);
- return err;
+ return -ENOTSUPP;
+ }
+ env->seen_exception = true;
+
+ /* In the case of the default callback, the cookie value passed
+ * to bpf_throw becomes the return value of the program.
+ */
+ if (!env->exception_callback_subprog) {
+ err = check_return_code(env, BPF_REG_1);
+ if (err < 0)
+ return err;
}
}
@@ -11234,6 +12173,7 @@ static int check_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,
/* Only exception is bpf_obj_new_impl */
if (meta.btf != btf_vmlinux ||
(meta.func_id != special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_new_impl] &&
+ meta.func_id != special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_percpu_obj_new_impl] &&
meta.func_id != special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_refcount_acquire_impl])) {
verbose(env, "acquire kernel function does not return PTR_TO_BTF_ID\n");
return -EINVAL;
@@ -11247,13 +12187,29 @@ static int check_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,
ptr_type = btf_type_skip_modifiers(desc_btf, t->type, &ptr_type_id);
if (meta.btf == btf_vmlinux && btf_id_set_contains(&special_kfunc_set, meta.func_id)) {
- if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_new_impl]) {
+ if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_new_impl] ||
+ meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_percpu_obj_new_impl]) {
+ struct btf_struct_meta *struct_meta;
struct btf *ret_btf;
u32 ret_btf_id;
- if (unlikely(!bpf_global_ma_set))
+ if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_new_impl] && !bpf_global_ma_set)
return -ENOMEM;
+ if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_percpu_obj_new_impl]) {
+ if (!bpf_global_percpu_ma_set) {
+ mutex_lock(&bpf_percpu_ma_lock);
+ if (!bpf_global_percpu_ma_set) {
+ err = bpf_mem_alloc_init(&bpf_global_percpu_ma, 0, true);
+ if (!err)
+ bpf_global_percpu_ma_set = true;
+ }
+ mutex_unlock(&bpf_percpu_ma_lock);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
+ }
+
if (((u64)(u32)meta.arg_constant.value) != meta.arg_constant.value) {
verbose(env, "local type ID argument must be in range [0, U32_MAX]\n");
return -EINVAL;
@@ -11264,24 +12220,38 @@ static int check_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,
/* This may be NULL due to user not supplying a BTF */
if (!ret_btf) {
- verbose(env, "bpf_obj_new requires prog BTF\n");
+ verbose(env, "bpf_obj_new/bpf_percpu_obj_new requires prog BTF\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
ret_t = btf_type_by_id(ret_btf, ret_btf_id);
if (!ret_t || !__btf_type_is_struct(ret_t)) {
- verbose(env, "bpf_obj_new type ID argument must be of a struct\n");
+ verbose(env, "bpf_obj_new/bpf_percpu_obj_new type ID argument must be of a struct\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
+ struct_meta = btf_find_struct_meta(ret_btf, ret_btf_id);
+ if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_percpu_obj_new_impl]) {
+ if (!__btf_type_is_scalar_struct(env, ret_btf, ret_t, 0)) {
+ verbose(env, "bpf_percpu_obj_new type ID argument must be of a struct of scalars\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (struct_meta) {
+ verbose(env, "bpf_percpu_obj_new type ID argument must not contain special fields\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+
mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC;
regs[BPF_REG_0].btf = ret_btf;
regs[BPF_REG_0].btf_id = ret_btf_id;
+ if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_percpu_obj_new_impl])
+ regs[BPF_REG_0].type |= MEM_PERCPU;
insn_aux->obj_new_size = ret_t->size;
- insn_aux->kptr_struct_meta =
- btf_find_struct_meta(ret_btf, ret_btf_id);
+ insn_aux->kptr_struct_meta = struct_meta;
} else if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_refcount_acquire_impl]) {
mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);
regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC;
@@ -11418,7 +12388,8 @@ static int check_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,
regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen;
} else if (btf_type_is_void(t)) {
if (meta.btf == btf_vmlinux && btf_id_set_contains(&special_kfunc_set, meta.func_id)) {
- if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_drop_impl]) {
+ if (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_drop_impl] ||
+ meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_percpu_obj_drop_impl]) {
insn_aux->kptr_struct_meta =
btf_find_struct_meta(meta.arg_btf,
meta.arg_btf_id);
@@ -12907,7 +13878,8 @@ static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
} else {
if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0 ||
(insn->imm != 16 && insn->imm != 32 && insn->imm != 64) ||
- BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) {
+ (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64 &&
+ BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_TO_LE)) {
verbose(env, "BPF_END uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
@@ -12932,11 +13904,24 @@ static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
} else if (opcode == BPF_MOV) {
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
- if (insn->imm != 0 || insn->off != 0) {
+ if (insn->imm != 0) {
verbose(env, "BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
+ if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU) {
+ if (insn->off != 0 && insn->off != 8 && insn->off != 16) {
+ verbose(env, "BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (insn->off != 0 && insn->off != 8 && insn->off != 16 &&
+ insn->off != 32) {
+ verbose(env, "BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+
/* check src operand */
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
if (err)
@@ -12960,18 +13945,42 @@ static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
!tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off);
if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) {
- /* case: R1 = R2
- * copy register state to dest reg
- */
- if (need_id)
- /* Assign src and dst registers the same ID
- * that will be used by find_equal_scalars()
- * to propagate min/max range.
+ if (insn->off == 0) {
+ /* case: R1 = R2
+ * copy register state to dest reg
*/
- src_reg->id = ++env->id_gen;
- copy_register_state(dst_reg, src_reg);
- dst_reg->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
- dst_reg->subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG;
+ if (need_id)
+ /* Assign src and dst registers the same ID
+ * that will be used by find_equal_scalars()
+ * to propagate min/max range.
+ */
+ src_reg->id = ++env->id_gen;
+ copy_register_state(dst_reg, src_reg);
+ dst_reg->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
+ dst_reg->subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG;
+ } else {
+ /* case: R1 = (s8, s16 s32)R2 */
+ if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) {
+ verbose(env,
+ "R%d sign-extension part of pointer\n",
+ insn->src_reg);
+ return -EACCES;
+ } else if (src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE) {
+ bool no_sext;
+
+ no_sext = src_reg->umax_value < (1ULL << (insn->off - 1));
+ if (no_sext && need_id)
+ src_reg->id = ++env->id_gen;
+ copy_register_state(dst_reg, src_reg);
+ if (!no_sext)
+ dst_reg->id = 0;
+ coerce_reg_to_size_sx(dst_reg, insn->off >> 3);
+ dst_reg->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
+ dst_reg->subreg_def = DEF_NOT_SUBREG;
+ } else {
+ mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
+ }
+ }
} else {
/* R1 = (u32) R2 */
if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) {
@@ -12980,19 +13989,33 @@ static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
insn->src_reg);
return -EACCES;
} else if (src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE) {
- bool is_src_reg_u32 = src_reg->umax_value <= U32_MAX;
-
- if (is_src_reg_u32 && need_id)
- src_reg->id = ++env->id_gen;
- copy_register_state(dst_reg, src_reg);
- /* Make sure ID is cleared if src_reg is not in u32 range otherwise
- * dst_reg min/max could be incorrectly
- * propagated into src_reg by find_equal_scalars()
- */
- if (!is_src_reg_u32)
- dst_reg->id = 0;
- dst_reg->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
- dst_reg->subreg_def = env->insn_idx + 1;
+ if (insn->off == 0) {
+ bool is_src_reg_u32 = src_reg->umax_value <= U32_MAX;
+
+ if (is_src_reg_u32 && need_id)
+ src_reg->id = ++env->id_gen;
+ copy_register_state(dst_reg, src_reg);
+ /* Make sure ID is cleared if src_reg is not in u32
+ * range otherwise dst_reg min/max could be incorrectly
+ * propagated into src_reg by find_equal_scalars()
+ */
+ if (!is_src_reg_u32)
+ dst_reg->id = 0;
+ dst_reg->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
+ dst_reg->subreg_def = env->insn_idx + 1;
+ } else {
+ /* case: W1 = (s8, s16)W2 */
+ bool no_sext = src_reg->umax_value < (1ULL << (insn->off - 1));
+
+ if (no_sext && need_id)
+ src_reg->id = ++env->id_gen;
+ copy_register_state(dst_reg, src_reg);
+ if (!no_sext)
+ dst_reg->id = 0;
+ dst_reg->live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
+ dst_reg->subreg_def = env->insn_idx + 1;
+ coerce_subreg_to_size_sx(dst_reg, insn->off >> 3);
+ }
} else {
mark_reg_unknown(env, regs,
insn->dst_reg);
@@ -13023,7 +14046,8 @@ static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
} else { /* all other ALU ops: and, sub, xor, add, ... */
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
- if (insn->imm != 0 || insn->off != 0) {
+ if (insn->imm != 0 || insn->off > 1 ||
+ (insn->off == 1 && opcode != BPF_MOD && opcode != BPF_DIV)) {
verbose(env, "BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
@@ -13032,7 +14056,8 @@ static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
if (err)
return err;
} else {
- if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0) {
+ if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off > 1 ||
+ (insn->off == 1 && opcode != BPF_MOD && opcode != BPF_DIV)) {
verbose(env, "BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
@@ -13160,12 +14185,16 @@ static int is_branch32_taken(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 val, u8 opcode)
return !!tnum_equals_const(subreg, val);
else if (val < reg->u32_min_value || val > reg->u32_max_value)
return 0;
+ else if (sval < reg->s32_min_value || sval > reg->s32_max_value)
+ return 0;
break;
case BPF_JNE:
if (tnum_is_const(subreg))
return !tnum_equals_const(subreg, val);
else if (val < reg->u32_min_value || val > reg->u32_max_value)
return 1;
+ else if (sval < reg->s32_min_value || sval > reg->s32_max_value)
+ return 1;
break;
case BPF_JSET:
if ((~subreg.mask & subreg.value) & val)
@@ -13237,12 +14266,16 @@ static int is_branch64_taken(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 val, u8 opcode)
return !!tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, val);
else if (val < reg->umin_value || val > reg->umax_value)
return 0;
+ else if (sval < reg->smin_value || sval > reg->smax_value)
+ return 0;
break;
case BPF_JNE:
if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off))
return !tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, val);
else if (val < reg->umin_value || val > reg->umax_value)
return 1;
+ else if (sval < reg->smin_value || sval > reg->smax_value)
+ return 1;
break;
case BPF_JSET:
if ((~reg->var_off.mask & reg->var_off.value) & val)
@@ -13817,6 +14850,12 @@ static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
return -EINVAL;
}
+ /* check src2 operand */
+ err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ dst_reg = &regs[insn->dst_reg];
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
if (insn->imm != 0) {
verbose(env, "BPF_JMP/JMP32 uses reserved fields\n");
@@ -13828,12 +14867,13 @@ static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
if (err)
return err;
- if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) {
+ src_reg = &regs[insn->src_reg];
+ if (!(reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(dst_reg) && reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(src_reg)) &&
+ is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) {
verbose(env, "R%d pointer comparison prohibited\n",
insn->src_reg);
return -EACCES;
}
- src_reg = &regs[insn->src_reg];
} else {
if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0) {
verbose(env, "BPF_JMP/JMP32 uses reserved fields\n");
@@ -13841,12 +14881,6 @@ static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
}
}
- /* check src2 operand */
- err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
- if (err)
- return err;
-
- dst_reg = &regs[insn->dst_reg];
is_jmp32 = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_JMP32;
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) {
@@ -13903,6 +14937,8 @@ static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
!sanitize_speculative_path(env, insn, *insn_idx + 1,
*insn_idx))
return -EFAULT;
+ if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL)
+ print_insn_state(env, this_branch->frame[this_branch->curframe]);
*insn_idx += insn->off;
return 0;
} else if (pred == 0) {
@@ -13915,6 +14951,8 @@ static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
*insn_idx + insn->off + 1,
*insn_idx))
return -EFAULT;
+ if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL)
+ print_insn_state(env, this_branch->frame[this_branch->curframe]);
return 0;
}
@@ -14193,7 +15231,7 @@ static int check_ld_abs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
* gen_ld_abs() may terminate the program at runtime, leading to
* reference leak.
*/
- err = check_reference_leak(env);
+ err = check_reference_leak(env, false);
if (err) {
verbose(env, "BPF_LD_[ABS|IND] cannot be mixed with socket references\n");
return err;
@@ -14242,19 +15280,19 @@ static int check_ld_abs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
return 0;
}
-static int check_return_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
+static int check_return_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno)
{
struct tnum enforce_attach_type_range = tnum_unknown;
const struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog;
struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
- struct tnum range = tnum_range(0, 1);
+ struct tnum range = tnum_range(0, 1), const_0 = tnum_const(0);
enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog);
int err;
struct bpf_func_state *frame = env->cur_state->frame[0];
const bool is_subprog = frame->subprogno;
/* LSM and struct_ops func-ptr's return type could be "void" */
- if (!is_subprog) {
+ if (!is_subprog || frame->in_exception_callback_fn) {
switch (prog_type) {
case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM:
if (prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_LSM_CGROUP)
@@ -14276,36 +15314,36 @@ static int check_return_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
* of bpf_exit, which means that program wrote
* something into it earlier
*/
- err = check_reg_arg(env, BPF_REG_0, SRC_OP);
+ err = check_reg_arg(env, regno, SRC_OP);
if (err)
return err;
- if (is_pointer_value(env, BPF_REG_0)) {
- verbose(env, "R0 leaks addr as return value\n");
+ if (is_pointer_value(env, regno)) {
+ verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr as return value\n", regno);
return -EACCES;
}
- reg = cur_regs(env) + BPF_REG_0;
+ reg = cur_regs(env) + regno;
if (frame->in_async_callback_fn) {
/* enforce return zero from async callbacks like timer */
if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) {
- verbose(env, "In async callback the register R0 is not a known value (%s)\n",
- reg_type_str(env, reg->type));
+ verbose(env, "In async callback the register R%d is not a known value (%s)\n",
+ regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type));
return -EINVAL;
}
- if (!tnum_in(tnum_const(0), reg->var_off)) {
- verbose_invalid_scalar(env, reg, &range, "async callback", "R0");
+ if (!tnum_in(const_0, reg->var_off)) {
+ verbose_invalid_scalar(env, reg, &const_0, "async callback", "R0");
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
- if (is_subprog) {
+ if (is_subprog && !frame->in_exception_callback_fn) {
if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) {
- verbose(env, "At subprogram exit the register R0 is not a scalar value (%s)\n",
- reg_type_str(env, reg->type));
+ verbose(env, "At subprogram exit the register R%d is not a scalar value (%s)\n",
+ regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type));
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
@@ -14315,10 +15353,13 @@ static int check_return_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK_ADDR:
if (env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_UDP4_RECVMSG ||
env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_UDP6_RECVMSG ||
+ env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_UNIX_RECVMSG ||
env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET4_GETPEERNAME ||
env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET6_GETPEERNAME ||
+ env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_UNIX_GETPEERNAME ||
env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET4_GETSOCKNAME ||
- env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET6_GETSOCKNAME)
+ env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET6_GETSOCKNAME ||
+ env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_UNIX_GETSOCKNAME)
range = tnum_range(1, 1);
if (env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET4_BIND ||
env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_INET6_BIND)
@@ -14387,8 +15428,8 @@ static int check_return_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
}
if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) {
- verbose(env, "At program exit the register R0 is not a known value (%s)\n",
- reg_type_str(env, reg->type));
+ verbose(env, "At program exit the register R%d is not a known value (%s)\n",
+ regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type));
return -EINVAL;
}
@@ -14447,21 +15488,6 @@ enum {
BRANCH = 2,
};
-static u32 state_htab_size(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
-{
- return env->prog->len;
-}
-
-static struct bpf_verifier_state_list **explored_state(
- struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
- int idx)
-{
- struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state;
- struct bpf_func_state *state = cur->frame[cur->curframe];
-
- return &env->explored_states[(idx ^ state->callsite) % state_htab_size(env)];
-}
-
static void mark_prune_point(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx)
{
env->insn_aux_data[idx].prune_point = true;
@@ -14482,6 +15508,15 @@ static bool is_force_checkpoint(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx)
return env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].force_checkpoint;
}
+static void mark_calls_callback(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx)
+{
+ env->insn_aux_data[idx].calls_callback = true;
+}
+
+static bool calls_callback(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx)
+{
+ return env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].calls_callback;
+}
enum {
DONE_EXPLORING = 0,
@@ -14493,8 +15528,7 @@ enum {
* w - next instruction
* e - edge
*/
-static int push_insn(int t, int w, int e, struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
- bool loop_ok)
+static int push_insn(int t, int w, int e, struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
{
int *insn_stack = env->cfg.insn_stack;
int *insn_state = env->cfg.insn_state;
@@ -14526,7 +15560,7 @@ static int push_insn(int t, int w, int e, struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
insn_stack[env->cfg.cur_stack++] = w;
return KEEP_EXPLORING;
} else if ((insn_state[w] & 0xF0) == DISCOVERED) {
- if (loop_ok && env->bpf_capable)
+ if (env->bpf_capable)
return DONE_EXPLORING;
verbose_linfo(env, t, "%d: ", t);
verbose_linfo(env, w, "%d: ", w);
@@ -14546,24 +15580,20 @@ static int visit_func_call_insn(int t, struct bpf_insn *insns,
struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
bool visit_callee)
{
- int ret;
+ int ret, insn_sz;
- ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env, false);
+ insn_sz = bpf_is_ldimm64(&insns[t]) ? 2 : 1;
+ ret = push_insn(t, t + insn_sz, FALLTHROUGH, env);
if (ret)
return ret;
- mark_prune_point(env, t + 1);
+ mark_prune_point(env, t + insn_sz);
/* when we exit from subprog, we need to record non-linear history */
- mark_jmp_point(env, t + 1);
+ mark_jmp_point(env, t + insn_sz);
if (visit_callee) {
mark_prune_point(env, t);
- ret = push_insn(t, t + insns[t].imm + 1, BRANCH, env,
- /* It's ok to allow recursion from CFG point of
- * view. __check_func_call() will do the actual
- * check.
- */
- bpf_pseudo_func(insns + t));
+ ret = push_insn(t, t + insns[t].imm + 1, BRANCH, env);
}
return ret;
}
@@ -14576,15 +15606,17 @@ static int visit_func_call_insn(int t, struct bpf_insn *insns,
static int visit_insn(int t, struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
{
struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi, *insn = &insns[t];
- int ret;
+ int ret, off, insn_sz;
if (bpf_pseudo_func(insn))
return visit_func_call_insn(t, insns, env, true);
/* All non-branch instructions have a single fall-through edge. */
if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_JMP &&
- BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_JMP32)
- return push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env, false);
+ BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_JMP32) {
+ insn_sz = bpf_is_ldimm64(insn) ? 2 : 1;
+ return push_insn(t, t + insn_sz, FALLTHROUGH, env);
+ }
switch (BPF_OP(insn->code)) {
case BPF_EXIT:
@@ -14598,6 +15630,21 @@ static int visit_insn(int t, struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
* async state will be pushed for further exploration.
*/
mark_prune_point(env, t);
+ /* For functions that invoke callbacks it is not known how many times
+ * callback would be called. Verifier models callback calling functions
+ * by repeatedly visiting callback bodies and returning to origin call
+ * instruction.
+ * In order to stop such iteration verifier needs to identify when a
+ * state identical some state from a previous iteration is reached.
+ * Check below forces creation of checkpoint before callback calling
+ * instruction to allow search for such identical states.
+ */
+ if (is_sync_callback_calling_insn(insn)) {
+ mark_calls_callback(env, t);
+ mark_force_checkpoint(env, t);
+ mark_prune_point(env, t);
+ mark_jmp_point(env, t);
+ }
if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL) {
struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta meta;
@@ -14624,14 +15671,18 @@ static int visit_insn(int t, struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K)
return -EINVAL;
+ if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_JMP)
+ off = insn->off;
+ else
+ off = insn->imm;
+
/* unconditional jump with single edge */
- ret = push_insn(t, t + insn->off + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env,
- true);
+ ret = push_insn(t, t + off + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env);
if (ret)
return ret;
- mark_prune_point(env, t + insn->off + 1);
- mark_jmp_point(env, t + insn->off + 1);
+ mark_prune_point(env, t + off + 1);
+ mark_jmp_point(env, t + off + 1);
return ret;
@@ -14639,11 +15690,11 @@ static int visit_insn(int t, struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
/* conditional jump with two edges */
mark_prune_point(env, t);
- ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env, true);
+ ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env);
if (ret)
return ret;
- return push_insn(t, t + insn->off + 1, BRANCH, env, true);
+ return push_insn(t, t + insn->off + 1, BRANCH, env);
}
}
@@ -14654,8 +15705,8 @@ static int check_cfg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
{
int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
int *insn_stack, *insn_state;
- int ret = 0;
- int i;
+ int ex_insn_beg, i, ret = 0;
+ bool ex_done = false;
insn_state = env->cfg.insn_state = kvcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!insn_state)
@@ -14671,6 +15722,7 @@ static int check_cfg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
insn_stack[0] = 0; /* 0 is the first instruction */
env->cfg.cur_stack = 1;
+walk_cfg:
while (env->cfg.cur_stack > 0) {
int t = insn_stack[env->cfg.cur_stack - 1];
@@ -14697,12 +15749,32 @@ static int check_cfg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
goto err_free;
}
+ if (env->exception_callback_subprog && !ex_done) {
+ ex_insn_beg = env->subprog_info[env->exception_callback_subprog].start;
+
+ insn_state[ex_insn_beg] = DISCOVERED;
+ insn_stack[0] = ex_insn_beg;
+ env->cfg.cur_stack = 1;
+ ex_done = true;
+ goto walk_cfg;
+ }
+
for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) {
+ struct bpf_insn *insn = &env->prog->insnsi[i];
+
if (insn_state[i] != EXPLORED) {
verbose(env, "unreachable insn %d\n", i);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto err_free;
}
+ if (bpf_is_ldimm64(insn)) {
+ if (insn_state[i + 1] != 0) {
+ verbose(env, "jump into the middle of ldimm64 insn %d\n", i);
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto err_free;
+ }
+ i++; /* skip second half of ldimm64 */
+ }
}
ret = 0; /* cfg looks good */
@@ -14734,20 +15806,18 @@ static int check_abnormal_return(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
#define MIN_BPF_FUNCINFO_SIZE 8
#define MAX_FUNCINFO_REC_SIZE 252
-static int check_btf_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
- const union bpf_attr *attr,
- bpfptr_t uattr)
+static int check_btf_func_early(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+ const union bpf_attr *attr,
+ bpfptr_t uattr)
{
- const struct btf_type *type, *func_proto, *ret_type;
- u32 i, nfuncs, urec_size, min_size;
u32 krec_size = sizeof(struct bpf_func_info);
+ const struct btf_type *type, *func_proto;
+ u32 i, nfuncs, urec_size, min_size;
struct bpf_func_info *krecord;
- struct bpf_func_info_aux *info_aux = NULL;
struct bpf_prog *prog;
const struct btf *btf;
- bpfptr_t urecord;
u32 prev_offset = 0;
- bool scalar_return;
+ bpfptr_t urecord;
int ret = -ENOMEM;
nfuncs = attr->func_info_cnt;
@@ -14757,11 +15827,6 @@ static int check_btf_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
return 0;
}
- if (nfuncs != env->subprog_cnt) {
- verbose(env, "number of funcs in func_info doesn't match number of subprogs\n");
- return -EINVAL;
- }
-
urec_size = attr->func_info_rec_size;
if (urec_size < MIN_BPF_FUNCINFO_SIZE ||
urec_size > MAX_FUNCINFO_REC_SIZE ||
@@ -14779,9 +15844,6 @@ static int check_btf_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
krecord = kvcalloc(nfuncs, krec_size, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN);
if (!krecord)
return -ENOMEM;
- info_aux = kcalloc(nfuncs, sizeof(*info_aux), GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN);
- if (!info_aux)
- goto err_free;
for (i = 0; i < nfuncs; i++) {
ret = bpf_check_uarg_tail_zero(urecord, krec_size, urec_size);
@@ -14820,11 +15882,6 @@ static int check_btf_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
goto err_free;
}
- if (env->subprog_info[i].start != krecord[i].insn_off) {
- verbose(env, "func_info BTF section doesn't match subprog layout in BPF program\n");
- goto err_free;
- }
-
/* check type_id */
type = btf_type_by_id(btf, krecord[i].type_id);
if (!type || !btf_type_is_func(type)) {
@@ -14832,12 +15889,77 @@ static int check_btf_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
krecord[i].type_id);
goto err_free;
}
- info_aux[i].linkage = BTF_INFO_VLEN(type->info);
func_proto = btf_type_by_id(btf, type->type);
if (unlikely(!func_proto || !btf_type_is_func_proto(func_proto)))
/* btf_func_check() already verified it during BTF load */
goto err_free;
+
+ prev_offset = krecord[i].insn_off;
+ bpfptr_add(&urecord, urec_size);
+ }
+
+ prog->aux->func_info = krecord;
+ prog->aux->func_info_cnt = nfuncs;
+ return 0;
+
+err_free:
+ kvfree(krecord);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int check_btf_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+ const union bpf_attr *attr,
+ bpfptr_t uattr)
+{
+ const struct btf_type *type, *func_proto, *ret_type;
+ u32 i, nfuncs, urec_size;
+ struct bpf_func_info *krecord;
+ struct bpf_func_info_aux *info_aux = NULL;
+ struct bpf_prog *prog;
+ const struct btf *btf;
+ bpfptr_t urecord;
+ bool scalar_return;
+ int ret = -ENOMEM;
+
+ nfuncs = attr->func_info_cnt;
+ if (!nfuncs) {
+ if (check_abnormal_return(env))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (nfuncs != env->subprog_cnt) {
+ verbose(env, "number of funcs in func_info doesn't match number of subprogs\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ urec_size = attr->func_info_rec_size;
+
+ prog = env->prog;
+ btf = prog->aux->btf;
+
+ urecord = make_bpfptr(attr->func_info, uattr.is_kernel);
+
+ krecord = prog->aux->func_info;
+ info_aux = kcalloc(nfuncs, sizeof(*info_aux), GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN);
+ if (!info_aux)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nfuncs; i++) {
+ /* check insn_off */
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+
+ if (env->subprog_info[i].start != krecord[i].insn_off) {
+ verbose(env, "func_info BTF section doesn't match subprog layout in BPF program\n");
+ goto err_free;
+ }
+
+ /* Already checked type_id */
+ type = btf_type_by_id(btf, krecord[i].type_id);
+ info_aux[i].linkage = BTF_INFO_VLEN(type->info);
+ /* Already checked func_proto */
+ func_proto = btf_type_by_id(btf, type->type);
+
ret_type = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, func_proto->type, NULL);
scalar_return =
btf_type_is_small_int(ret_type) || btf_is_any_enum(ret_type);
@@ -14850,17 +15972,13 @@ static int check_btf_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
goto err_free;
}
- prev_offset = krecord[i].insn_off;
bpfptr_add(&urecord, urec_size);
}
- prog->aux->func_info = krecord;
- prog->aux->func_info_cnt = nfuncs;
prog->aux->func_info_aux = info_aux;
return 0;
err_free:
- kvfree(krecord);
kfree(info_aux);
return ret;
}
@@ -14873,7 +15991,8 @@ static void adjust_btf_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
if (!aux->func_info)
return;
- for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++)
+ /* func_info is not available for hidden subprogs */
+ for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt - env->hidden_subprog_cnt; i++)
aux->func_info[i].insn_off = env->subprog_info[i].start;
}
@@ -15077,9 +16196,9 @@ static int check_core_relo(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
return err;
}
-static int check_btf_info(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
- const union bpf_attr *attr,
- bpfptr_t uattr)
+static int check_btf_info_early(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+ const union bpf_attr *attr,
+ bpfptr_t uattr)
{
struct btf *btf;
int err;
@@ -15099,6 +16218,24 @@ static int check_btf_info(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
}
env->prog->aux->btf = btf;
+ err = check_btf_func_early(env, attr, uattr);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int check_btf_info(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+ const union bpf_attr *attr,
+ bpfptr_t uattr)
+{
+ int err;
+
+ if (!attr->func_info_cnt && !attr->line_info_cnt) {
+ if (check_abnormal_return(env))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
err = check_btf_func(env, attr, uattr);
if (err)
return err;
@@ -15257,18 +16394,14 @@ static void clean_live_states(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn,
struct bpf_verifier_state *cur)
{
struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl;
- int i;
sl = *explored_state(env, insn);
while (sl) {
if (sl->state.branches)
goto next;
if (sl->state.insn_idx != insn ||
- sl->state.curframe != cur->curframe)
+ !same_callsites(&sl->state, cur))
goto next;
- for (i = 0; i <= cur->curframe; i++)
- if (sl->state.frame[i]->callsite != cur->frame[i]->callsite)
- goto next;
clean_verifier_state(env, &sl->state);
next:
sl = sl->next;
@@ -15286,8 +16419,11 @@ static bool regs_exact(const struct bpf_reg_state *rold,
/* Returns true if (rold safe implies rcur safe) */
static bool regsafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *rold,
- struct bpf_reg_state *rcur, struct bpf_idmap *idmap)
+ struct bpf_reg_state *rcur, struct bpf_idmap *idmap, bool exact)
{
+ if (exact)
+ return regs_exact(rold, rcur, idmap);
+
if (!(rold->live & REG_LIVE_READ))
/* explored state didn't use this */
return true;
@@ -15404,7 +16540,7 @@ static bool regsafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *rold,
}
static bool stacksafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_state *old,
- struct bpf_func_state *cur, struct bpf_idmap *idmap)
+ struct bpf_func_state *cur, struct bpf_idmap *idmap, bool exact)
{
int i, spi;
@@ -15417,7 +16553,12 @@ static bool stacksafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_state *old,
spi = i / BPF_REG_SIZE;
- if (!(old->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live & REG_LIVE_READ)) {
+ if (exact &&
+ old->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE] !=
+ cur->stack[spi].slot_type[i % BPF_REG_SIZE])
+ return false;
+
+ if (!(old->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.live & REG_LIVE_READ) && !exact) {
i += BPF_REG_SIZE - 1;
/* explored state didn't use this */
continue;
@@ -15467,7 +16608,7 @@ static bool stacksafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_state *old,
* return false to continue verification of this path
*/
if (!regsafe(env, &old->stack[spi].spilled_ptr,
- &cur->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, idmap))
+ &cur->stack[spi].spilled_ptr, idmap, exact))
return false;
break;
case STACK_DYNPTR:
@@ -15549,16 +16690,16 @@ static bool refsafe(struct bpf_func_state *old, struct bpf_func_state *cur,
* the current state will reach 'bpf_exit' instruction safely
*/
static bool func_states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_state *old,
- struct bpf_func_state *cur)
+ struct bpf_func_state *cur, bool exact)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++)
if (!regsafe(env, &old->regs[i], &cur->regs[i],
- &env->idmap_scratch))
+ &env->idmap_scratch, exact))
return false;
- if (!stacksafe(env, old, cur, &env->idmap_scratch))
+ if (!stacksafe(env, old, cur, &env->idmap_scratch, exact))
return false;
if (!refsafe(old, cur, &env->idmap_scratch))
@@ -15567,17 +16708,23 @@ static bool func_states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_stat
return true;
}
+static void reset_idmap_scratch(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
+{
+ env->idmap_scratch.tmp_id_gen = env->id_gen;
+ memset(&env->idmap_scratch.map, 0, sizeof(env->idmap_scratch.map));
+}
+
static bool states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_verifier_state *old,
- struct bpf_verifier_state *cur)
+ struct bpf_verifier_state *cur,
+ bool exact)
{
int i;
if (old->curframe != cur->curframe)
return false;
- env->idmap_scratch.tmp_id_gen = env->id_gen;
- memset(&env->idmap_scratch.map, 0, sizeof(env->idmap_scratch.map));
+ reset_idmap_scratch(env);
/* Verification state from speculative execution simulation
* must never prune a non-speculative execution one.
@@ -15607,7 +16754,7 @@ static bool states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
for (i = 0; i <= old->curframe; i++) {
if (old->frame[i]->callsite != cur->frame[i]->callsite)
return false;
- if (!func_states_equal(env, old->frame[i], cur->frame[i]))
+ if (!func_states_equal(env, old->frame[i], cur->frame[i], exact))
return false;
}
return true;
@@ -15861,10 +17008,11 @@ static int is_state_visited(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx)
{
struct bpf_verifier_state_list *new_sl;
struct bpf_verifier_state_list *sl, **pprev;
- struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state, *new;
- int i, j, err, states_cnt = 0;
+ struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state, *new, *loop_entry;
+ int i, j, n, err, states_cnt = 0;
bool force_new_state = env->test_state_freq || is_force_checkpoint(env, insn_idx);
bool add_new_state = force_new_state;
+ bool force_exact;
/* bpf progs typically have pruning point every 4 instructions
* http://vger.kernel.org/bpfconf2019.html#session-1
@@ -15917,9 +17065,33 @@ static int is_state_visited(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx)
* It's safe to assume that iterator loop will finish, taking into
* account iter_next() contract of eventually returning
* sticky NULL result.
+ *
+ * Note, that states have to be compared exactly in this case because
+ * read and precision marks might not be finalized inside the loop.
+ * E.g. as in the program below:
+ *
+ * 1. r7 = -16
+ * 2. r6 = bpf_get_prandom_u32()
+ * 3. while (bpf_iter_num_next(&fp[-8])) {
+ * 4. if (r6 != 42) {
+ * 5. r7 = -32
+ * 6. r6 = bpf_get_prandom_u32()
+ * 7. continue
+ * 8. }
+ * 9. r0 = r10
+ * 10. r0 += r7
+ * 11. r8 = *(u64 *)(r0 + 0)
+ * 12. r6 = bpf_get_prandom_u32()
+ * 13. }
+ *
+ * Here verifier would first visit path 1-3, create a checkpoint at 3
+ * with r7=-16, continue to 4-7,3. Existing checkpoint at 3 does
+ * not have read or precision mark for r7 yet, thus inexact states
+ * comparison would discard current state with r7=-32
+ * => unsafe memory access at 11 would not be caught.
*/
if (is_iter_next_insn(env, insn_idx)) {
- if (states_equal(env, &sl->state, cur)) {
+ if (states_equal(env, &sl->state, cur, true)) {
struct bpf_func_state *cur_frame;
struct bpf_reg_state *iter_state, *iter_reg;
int spi;
@@ -15935,17 +17107,29 @@ static int is_state_visited(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx)
*/
spi = __get_spi(iter_reg->off + iter_reg->var_off.value);
iter_state = &func(env, iter_reg)->stack[spi].spilled_ptr;
- if (iter_state->iter.state == BPF_ITER_STATE_ACTIVE)
+ if (iter_state->iter.state == BPF_ITER_STATE_ACTIVE) {
+ update_loop_entry(cur, &sl->state);
goto hit;
+ }
}
goto skip_inf_loop_check;
}
+ if (calls_callback(env, insn_idx)) {
+ if (states_equal(env, &sl->state, cur, true))
+ goto hit;
+ goto skip_inf_loop_check;
+ }
/* attempt to detect infinite loop to avoid unnecessary doomed work */
if (states_maybe_looping(&sl->state, cur) &&
- states_equal(env, &sl->state, cur) &&
- !iter_active_depths_differ(&sl->state, cur)) {
+ states_equal(env, &sl->state, cur, false) &&
+ !iter_active_depths_differ(&sl->state, cur) &&
+ sl->state.callback_unroll_depth == cur->callback_unroll_depth) {
verbose_linfo(env, insn_idx, "; ");
verbose(env, "infinite loop detected at insn %d\n", insn_idx);
+ verbose(env, "cur state:");
+ print_verifier_state(env, cur->frame[cur->curframe], true);
+ verbose(env, "old state:");
+ print_verifier_state(env, sl->state.frame[cur->curframe], true);
return -EINVAL;
}
/* if the verifier is processing a loop, avoid adding new state
@@ -15967,7 +17151,36 @@ skip_inf_loop_check:
add_new_state = false;
goto miss;
}
- if (states_equal(env, &sl->state, cur)) {
+ /* If sl->state is a part of a loop and this loop's entry is a part of
+ * current verification path then states have to be compared exactly.
+ * 'force_exact' is needed to catch the following case:
+ *
+ * initial Here state 'succ' was processed first,
+ * | it was eventually tracked to produce a
+ * V state identical to 'hdr'.
+ * .---------> hdr All branches from 'succ' had been explored
+ * | | and thus 'succ' has its .branches == 0.
+ * | V
+ * | .------... Suppose states 'cur' and 'succ' correspond
+ * | | | to the same instruction + callsites.
+ * | V V In such case it is necessary to check
+ * | ... ... if 'succ' and 'cur' are states_equal().
+ * | | | If 'succ' and 'cur' are a part of the
+ * | V V same loop exact flag has to be set.
+ * | succ <- cur To check if that is the case, verify
+ * | | if loop entry of 'succ' is in current
+ * | V DFS path.
+ * | ...
+ * | |
+ * '----'
+ *
+ * Additional details are in the comment before get_loop_entry().
+ */
+ loop_entry = get_loop_entry(&sl->state);
+ force_exact = loop_entry && loop_entry->branches > 0;
+ if (states_equal(env, &sl->state, cur, force_exact)) {
+ if (force_exact)
+ update_loop_entry(cur, loop_entry);
hit:
sl->hit_cnt++;
/* reached equivalent register/stack state,
@@ -16006,13 +17219,18 @@ miss:
* to keep checking from state equivalence point of view.
* Higher numbers increase max_states_per_insn and verification time,
* but do not meaningfully decrease insn_processed.
+ * 'n' controls how many times state could miss before eviction.
+ * Use bigger 'n' for checkpoints because evicting checkpoint states
+ * too early would hinder iterator convergence.
*/
- if (sl->miss_cnt > sl->hit_cnt * 3 + 3) {
+ n = is_force_checkpoint(env, insn_idx) && sl->state.branches > 0 ? 64 : 3;
+ if (sl->miss_cnt > sl->hit_cnt * n + n) {
/* the state is unlikely to be useful. Remove it to
* speed up verification
*/
*pprev = sl->next;
- if (sl->state.frame[0]->regs[0].live & REG_LIVE_DONE) {
+ if (sl->state.frame[0]->regs[0].live & REG_LIVE_DONE &&
+ !sl->state.used_as_loop_entry) {
u32 br = sl->state.branches;
WARN_ONCE(br,
@@ -16081,6 +17299,7 @@ next:
cur->parent = new;
cur->first_insn_idx = insn_idx;
+ cur->dfs_depth = new->dfs_depth + 1;
clear_jmp_history(cur);
new_sl->next = *explored_state(env, insn_idx);
*explored_state(env, insn_idx) = new_sl;
@@ -16178,7 +17397,7 @@ static int save_aux_ptr_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, enum bpf_reg_type typ
* Have to support a use case when one path through
* the program yields TRUSTED pointer while another
* is UNTRUSTED. Fallback to UNTRUSTED to generate
- * BPF_PROBE_MEM.
+ * BPF_PROBE_MEM/BPF_PROBE_MEMSX.
*/
*prev_type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED;
} else {
@@ -16201,6 +17420,7 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
int prev_insn_idx = -1;
for (;;) {
+ bool exception_exit = false;
struct bpf_insn *insn;
u8 class;
int err;
@@ -16319,7 +17539,8 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
*/
err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, insn->src_reg,
insn->off, BPF_SIZE(insn->code),
- BPF_READ, insn->dst_reg, false);
+ BPF_READ, insn->dst_reg, false,
+ BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_MEMSX);
if (err)
return err;
@@ -16356,7 +17577,7 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
/* check that memory (dst_reg + off) is writeable */
err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, insn->dst_reg,
insn->off, BPF_SIZE(insn->code),
- BPF_WRITE, insn->src_reg, false);
+ BPF_WRITE, insn->src_reg, false, false);
if (err)
return err;
@@ -16381,7 +17602,7 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
/* check that memory (dst_reg + off) is writeable */
err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, insn->dst_reg,
insn->off, BPF_SIZE(insn->code),
- BPF_WRITE, -1, false);
+ BPF_WRITE, -1, false, false);
if (err)
return err;
@@ -16414,27 +17635,35 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
return -EINVAL;
}
}
- if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL)
+ if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) {
err = check_func_call(env, insn, &env->insn_idx);
- else if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL)
+ } else if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL) {
err = check_kfunc_call(env, insn, &env->insn_idx);
- else
+ if (!err && is_bpf_throw_kfunc(insn)) {
+ exception_exit = true;
+ goto process_bpf_exit_full;
+ }
+ } else {
err = check_helper_call(env, insn, &env->insn_idx);
+ }
if (err)
return err;
mark_reg_scratched(env, BPF_REG_0);
} else if (opcode == BPF_JA) {
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K ||
- insn->imm != 0 ||
insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 ||
insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 ||
- class == BPF_JMP32) {
+ (class == BPF_JMP && insn->imm != 0) ||
+ (class == BPF_JMP32 && insn->off != 0)) {
verbose(env, "BPF_JA uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
- env->insn_idx += insn->off + 1;
+ if (class == BPF_JMP)
+ env->insn_idx += insn->off + 1;
+ else
+ env->insn_idx += insn->imm + 1;
continue;
} else if (opcode == BPF_EXIT) {
@@ -16446,14 +17675,15 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
verbose(env, "BPF_EXIT uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
-
+process_bpf_exit_full:
if (env->cur_state->active_lock.ptr &&
!in_rbtree_lock_required_cb(env)) {
verbose(env, "bpf_spin_unlock is missing\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
- if (env->cur_state->active_rcu_lock) {
+ if (env->cur_state->active_rcu_lock &&
+ !in_rbtree_lock_required_cb(env)) {
verbose(env, "bpf_rcu_read_unlock is missing\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
@@ -16464,10 +17694,23 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
* function, for which reference_state must
* match caller reference state when it exits.
*/
- err = check_reference_leak(env);
+ err = check_reference_leak(env, exception_exit);
if (err)
return err;
+ /* The side effect of the prepare_func_exit
+ * which is being skipped is that it frees
+ * bpf_func_state. Typically, process_bpf_exit
+ * will only be hit with outermost exit.
+ * copy_verifier_state in pop_stack will handle
+ * freeing of any extra bpf_func_state left over
+ * from not processing all nested function
+ * exits. We also skip return code checks as
+ * they are not needed for exceptional exits.
+ */
+ if (exception_exit)
+ goto process_bpf_exit;
+
if (state->curframe) {
/* exit from nested function */
err = prepare_func_exit(env, &env->insn_idx);
@@ -16477,7 +17720,7 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
continue;
}
- err = check_return_code(env);
+ err = check_return_code(env, BPF_REG_0);
if (err)
return err;
process_bpf_exit:
@@ -16733,11 +17976,6 @@ static int check_map_prog_compatibility(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
verbose(env, "tracing progs cannot use bpf_spin_lock yet\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
-
- if (prog->aux->sleepable) {
- verbose(env, "sleepable progs cannot use bpf_spin_lock yet\n");
- return -EINVAL;
- }
}
if (btf_record_has_field(map->record, BPF_TIMER)) {
@@ -16809,7 +18047,8 @@ static int resolve_pseudo_ldimm64(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LDX &&
- (BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM || insn->imm != 0)) {
+ ((BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM && BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEMSX) ||
+ insn->imm != 0)) {
verbose(env, "BPF_LDX uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
@@ -17280,13 +18519,13 @@ static bool insn_is_cond_jump(u8 code)
{
u8 op;
+ op = BPF_OP(code);
if (BPF_CLASS(code) == BPF_JMP32)
- return true;
+ return op != BPF_JA;
if (BPF_CLASS(code) != BPF_JMP)
return false;
- op = BPF_OP(code);
return op != BPF_JA && op != BPF_EXIT && op != BPF_CALL;
}
@@ -17503,11 +18742,15 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
bpf_convert_ctx_access_t convert_ctx_access;
+ u8 mode;
if (insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) ||
insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) ||
insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W) ||
- insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW)) {
+ insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW) ||
+ insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEMSX | BPF_B) ||
+ insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEMSX | BPF_H) ||
+ insn->code == (BPF_LDX | BPF_MEMSX | BPF_W)) {
type = BPF_READ;
} else if (insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_B) ||
insn->code == (BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_H) ||
@@ -17566,8 +18809,12 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
*/
case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC | PTR_UNTRUSTED:
if (type == BPF_READ) {
- insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_PROBE_MEM |
- BPF_SIZE((insn)->code);
+ if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_MEM)
+ insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_PROBE_MEM |
+ BPF_SIZE((insn)->code);
+ else
+ insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_PROBE_MEMSX |
+ BPF_SIZE((insn)->code);
env->prog->aux->num_exentries++;
}
continue;
@@ -17577,6 +18824,7 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
ctx_field_size = env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].ctx_field_size;
size = BPF_LDST_BYTES(insn);
+ mode = BPF_MODE(insn->code);
/* If the read access is a narrower load of the field,
* convert to a 4/8-byte load, to minimum program type specific
@@ -17636,6 +18884,10 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
(1ULL << size * 8) - 1);
}
}
+ if (mode == BPF_MEMSX)
+ insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MOV | BPF_X,
+ insn->dst_reg, insn->dst_reg,
+ size * 8, 0);
new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt);
if (!new_prog)
@@ -17755,11 +19007,15 @@ static int jit_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
insn = func[i]->insnsi;
for (j = 0; j < func[i]->len; j++, insn++) {
if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LDX &&
- BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_PROBE_MEM)
+ (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_PROBE_MEM ||
+ BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_PROBE_MEMSX))
num_exentries++;
}
func[i]->aux->num_exentries = num_exentries;
func[i]->aux->tail_call_reachable = env->subprog_info[i].tail_call_reachable;
+ func[i]->aux->exception_cb = env->subprog_info[i].is_exception_cb;
+ if (!i)
+ func[i]->aux->exception_boundary = env->seen_exception;
func[i] = bpf_int_jit_compile(func[i]);
if (!func[i]->jited) {
err = -ENOTSUPP;
@@ -17799,7 +19055,8 @@ static int jit_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
* the call instruction, as an index for this list
*/
func[i]->aux->func = func;
- func[i]->aux->func_cnt = env->subprog_cnt;
+ func[i]->aux->func_cnt = env->subprog_cnt - env->hidden_subprog_cnt;
+ func[i]->aux->real_func_cnt = env->subprog_cnt;
}
for (i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
old_bpf_func = func[i]->bpf_func;
@@ -17845,7 +19102,10 @@ static int jit_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
prog->aux->extable = func[0]->aux->extable;
prog->aux->num_exentries = func[0]->aux->num_exentries;
prog->aux->func = func;
- prog->aux->func_cnt = env->subprog_cnt;
+ prog->aux->func_cnt = env->subprog_cnt - env->hidden_subprog_cnt;
+ prog->aux->real_func_cnt = env->subprog_cnt;
+ prog->aux->bpf_exception_cb = (void *)func[env->exception_callback_subprog]->bpf_func;
+ prog->aux->exception_boundary = func[0]->aux->exception_boundary;
bpf_prog_jit_attempt_done(prog);
return 0;
out_free:
@@ -18012,21 +19272,42 @@ static int fixup_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,
insn->imm = BPF_CALL_IMM(desc->addr);
if (insn->off)
return 0;
- if (desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_new_impl]) {
+ if (desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_new_impl] ||
+ desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_percpu_obj_new_impl]) {
struct btf_struct_meta *kptr_struct_meta = env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].kptr_struct_meta;
struct bpf_insn addr[2] = { BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_2, (long)kptr_struct_meta) };
u64 obj_new_size = env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].obj_new_size;
+ if (desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_percpu_obj_new_impl] && kptr_struct_meta) {
+ verbose(env, "verifier internal error: NULL kptr_struct_meta expected at insn_idx %d\n",
+ insn_idx);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+
insn_buf[0] = BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_1, obj_new_size);
insn_buf[1] = addr[0];
insn_buf[2] = addr[1];
insn_buf[3] = *insn;
*cnt = 4;
} else if (desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_obj_drop_impl] ||
+ desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_percpu_obj_drop_impl] ||
desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_refcount_acquire_impl]) {
struct btf_struct_meta *kptr_struct_meta = env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].kptr_struct_meta;
struct bpf_insn addr[2] = { BPF_LD_IMM64(BPF_REG_2, (long)kptr_struct_meta) };
+ if (desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_percpu_obj_drop_impl] && kptr_struct_meta) {
+ verbose(env, "verifier internal error: NULL kptr_struct_meta expected at insn_idx %d\n",
+ insn_idx);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+
+ if (desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_refcount_acquire_impl] &&
+ !kptr_struct_meta) {
+ verbose(env, "verifier internal error: kptr_struct_meta expected at insn_idx %d\n",
+ insn_idx);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+
insn_buf[0] = addr[0];
insn_buf[1] = addr[1];
insn_buf[2] = *insn;
@@ -18034,6 +19315,7 @@ static int fixup_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,
} else if (desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_back_impl] ||
desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_list_push_front_impl] ||
desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_rbtree_add_impl]) {
+ struct btf_struct_meta *kptr_struct_meta = env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].kptr_struct_meta;
int struct_meta_reg = BPF_REG_3;
int node_offset_reg = BPF_REG_4;
@@ -18043,6 +19325,12 @@ static int fixup_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,
node_offset_reg = BPF_REG_5;
}
+ if (!kptr_struct_meta) {
+ verbose(env, "verifier internal error: kptr_struct_meta expected at insn_idx %d\n",
+ insn_idx);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+
__fixup_collection_insert_kfunc(&env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx], struct_meta_reg,
node_offset_reg, insn, insn_buf, cnt);
} else if (desc->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx] ||
@@ -18053,6 +19341,33 @@ static int fixup_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,
return 0;
}
+/* The function requires that first instruction in 'patch' is insnsi[prog->len - 1] */
+static int add_hidden_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *patch, int len)
+{
+ struct bpf_subprog_info *info = env->subprog_info;
+ int cnt = env->subprog_cnt;
+ struct bpf_prog *prog;
+
+ /* We only reserve one slot for hidden subprogs in subprog_info. */
+ if (env->hidden_subprog_cnt) {
+ verbose(env, "verifier internal error: only one hidden subprog supported\n");
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+ /* We're not patching any existing instruction, just appending the new
+ * ones for the hidden subprog. Hence all of the adjustment operations
+ * in bpf_patch_insn_data are no-ops.
+ */
+ prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, env->prog->len - 1, patch, len);
+ if (!prog)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ env->prog = prog;
+ info[cnt + 1].start = info[cnt].start;
+ info[cnt].start = prog->len - len + 1;
+ env->subprog_cnt++;
+ env->hidden_subprog_cnt++;
+ return 0;
+}
+
/* Do various post-verification rewrites in a single program pass.
* These rewrites simplify JIT and interpreter implementations.
*/
@@ -18071,6 +19386,26 @@ static int do_misc_fixups(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
struct bpf_map *map_ptr;
int i, ret, cnt, delta = 0;
+ if (env->seen_exception && !env->exception_callback_subprog) {
+ struct bpf_insn patch[] = {
+ env->prog->insnsi[insn_cnt - 1],
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ };
+
+ ret = add_hidden_subprog(env, patch, ARRAY_SIZE(patch));
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ prog = env->prog;
+ insn = prog->insnsi;
+
+ env->exception_callback_subprog = env->subprog_cnt - 1;
+ /* Don't update insn_cnt, as add_hidden_subprog always appends insns */
+ env->subprog_info[env->exception_callback_subprog].is_cb = true;
+ env->subprog_info[env->exception_callback_subprog].is_async_cb = true;
+ env->subprog_info[env->exception_callback_subprog].is_exception_cb = true;
+ }
+
for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
/* Make divide-by-zero exceptions impossible. */
if (insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MOD | BPF_X) ||
@@ -18340,6 +19675,25 @@ static int do_misc_fixups(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
goto patch_call_imm;
}
+ /* bpf_per_cpu_ptr() and bpf_this_cpu_ptr() */
+ if (env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].call_with_percpu_alloc_ptr) {
+ /* patch with 'r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 + 0)' since for percpu data,
+ * bpf_mem_alloc() returns a ptr to the percpu data ptr.
+ */
+ insn_buf[0] = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_1, 0);
+ insn_buf[1] = *insn;
+ cnt = 2;
+
+ new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt);
+ if (!new_prog)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ delta += cnt - 1;
+ env->prog = prog = new_prog;
+ insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
+ goto patch_call_imm;
+ }
+
/* BPF_EMIT_CALL() assumptions in some of the map_gen_lookup
* and other inlining handlers are currently limited to 64 bit
* only.
@@ -18749,7 +20103,7 @@ static void free_states(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
}
}
-static int do_check_common(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog)
+static int do_check_common(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog, bool is_ex_cb)
{
bool pop_log = !(env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL2);
struct bpf_verifier_state *state;
@@ -18780,7 +20134,7 @@ static int do_check_common(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog)
regs = state->frame[state->curframe]->regs;
if (subprog || env->prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT) {
- ret = btf_prepare_func_args(env, subprog, regs);
+ ret = btf_prepare_func_args(env, subprog, regs, is_ex_cb);
if (ret)
goto out;
for (i = BPF_REG_1; i <= BPF_REG_5; i++) {
@@ -18796,6 +20150,12 @@ static int do_check_common(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog)
regs[i].id = ++env->id_gen;
}
}
+ if (is_ex_cb) {
+ state->frame[0]->in_exception_callback_fn = true;
+ env->subprog_info[subprog].is_cb = true;
+ env->subprog_info[subprog].is_async_cb = true;
+ env->subprog_info[subprog].is_exception_cb = true;
+ }
} else {
/* 1st arg to a function */
regs[BPF_REG_1].type = PTR_TO_CTX;
@@ -18860,7 +20220,7 @@ static int do_check_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
continue;
env->insn_idx = env->subprog_info[i].start;
WARN_ON_ONCE(env->insn_idx == 0);
- ret = do_check_common(env, i);
+ ret = do_check_common(env, i, env->exception_callback_subprog == i);
if (ret) {
return ret;
} else if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) {
@@ -18877,7 +20237,7 @@ static int do_check_main(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
int ret;
env->insn_idx = 0;
- ret = do_check_common(env, 0);
+ ret = do_check_common(env, 0, false);
if (!ret)
env->prog->aux->stack_depth = env->subprog_info[0].stack_depth;
return ret;
@@ -19046,6 +20406,12 @@ int bpf_check_attach_target(struct bpf_verifier_log *log,
bpf_log(log, "Subprog %s doesn't exist\n", tname);
return -EINVAL;
}
+ if (aux->func && aux->func[subprog]->aux->exception_cb) {
+ bpf_log(log,
+ "%s programs cannot attach to exception callback\n",
+ prog_extension ? "Extension" : "FENTRY/FEXIT");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
conservative = aux->func_info_aux[subprog].unreliable;
if (prog_extension) {
if (conservative) {
@@ -19375,6 +20741,9 @@ static int check_attach_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
if (!tr)
return -ENOMEM;
+ if (tgt_prog && tgt_prog->aux->tail_call_reachable)
+ tr->flags = BPF_TRAMP_F_TAIL_CALL_CTX;
+
prog->aux->dst_trampoline = tr;
return 0;
}
@@ -19470,6 +20839,10 @@ int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr, bpfptr_t uattr, __u3
if (!env->explored_states)
goto skip_full_check;
+ ret = check_btf_info_early(env, attr, uattr);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto skip_full_check;
+
ret = add_subprog_and_kfunc(env);
if (ret < 0)
goto skip_full_check;