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Diffstat (limited to 'include/linux/kvm_host.h')
-rw-r--r--include/linux/kvm_host.h63
1 files changed, 61 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
index 8895b95b6a22..8583ed3ff344 100644
--- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h
+++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
#include <linux/signal.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/sched/stat.h>
#include <linux/bug.h>
#include <linux/minmax.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
@@ -146,7 +147,7 @@ static inline bool is_error_page(struct page *page)
*/
#define KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH (0 | KVM_REQUEST_WAIT | KVM_REQUEST_NO_WAKEUP)
#define KVM_REQ_MMU_RELOAD (1 | KVM_REQUEST_WAIT | KVM_REQUEST_NO_WAKEUP)
-#define KVM_REQ_PENDING_TIMER 2
+#define KVM_REQ_UNBLOCK 2
#define KVM_REQ_UNHALT 3
#define KVM_REQUEST_ARCH_BASE 8
@@ -265,6 +266,11 @@ static inline bool kvm_vcpu_mapped(struct kvm_host_map *map)
return !!map->hva;
}
+static inline bool kvm_vcpu_can_poll(ktime_t cur, ktime_t stop)
+{
+ return single_task_running() && !need_resched() && ktime_before(cur, stop);
+}
+
/*
* Sometimes a large or cross-page mmio needs to be broken up into separate
* exits for userspace servicing.
@@ -338,6 +344,51 @@ struct kvm_vcpu {
struct kvm_dirty_ring dirty_ring;
};
+/* must be called with irqs disabled */
+static __always_inline void guest_enter_irqoff(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * This is running in ioctl context so its safe to assume that it's the
+ * stime pending cputime to flush.
+ */
+ instrumentation_begin();
+ vtime_account_guest_enter();
+ instrumentation_end();
+
+ /*
+ * KVM does not hold any references to rcu protected data when it
+ * switches CPU into a guest mode. In fact switching to a guest mode
+ * is very similar to exiting to userspace from rcu point of view. In
+ * addition CPU may stay in a guest mode for quite a long time (up to
+ * one time slice). Lets treat guest mode as quiescent state, just like
+ * we do with user-mode execution.
+ */
+ if (!context_tracking_guest_enter()) {
+ instrumentation_begin();
+ rcu_virt_note_context_switch(smp_processor_id());
+ instrumentation_end();
+ }
+}
+
+static __always_inline void guest_exit_irqoff(void)
+{
+ context_tracking_guest_exit();
+
+ instrumentation_begin();
+ /* Flush the guest cputime we spent on the guest */
+ vtime_account_guest_exit();
+ instrumentation_end();
+}
+
+static inline void guest_exit(void)
+{
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+ local_irq_save(flags);
+ guest_exit_irqoff();
+ local_irq_restore(flags);
+}
+
static inline int kvm_vcpu_exiting_guest_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
/*
@@ -1134,7 +1185,15 @@ __gfn_to_memslot(struct kvm_memslots *slots, gfn_t gfn)
static inline unsigned long
__gfn_to_hva_memslot(const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn)
{
- return slot->userspace_addr + (gfn - slot->base_gfn) * PAGE_SIZE;
+ /*
+ * The index was checked originally in search_memslots. To avoid
+ * that a malicious guest builds a Spectre gadget out of e.g. page
+ * table walks, do not let the processor speculate loads outside
+ * the guest's registered memslots.
+ */
+ unsigned long offset = gfn - slot->base_gfn;
+ offset = array_index_nospec(offset, slot->npages);
+ return slot->userspace_addr + offset * PAGE_SIZE;
}
static inline int memslot_id(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn)