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-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/acpi/cppc.c7
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/amd_nb.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c14
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c14
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c32
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c15
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/amd.c51
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/core.c4
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/ctrlmondata.c23
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c10
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c4
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c4
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/traps.c12
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S4
14 files changed, 151 insertions, 45 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/cppc.c b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/cppc.c
index 956984054bf3..aab9d0570841 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/cppc.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/cppc.c
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ static void amd_set_max_freq_ratio(void)
static DEFINE_MUTEX(freq_invariance_lock);
-void init_freq_invariance_cppc(void)
+static inline void init_freq_invariance_cppc(void)
{
static bool init_done;
@@ -127,6 +127,11 @@ void init_freq_invariance_cppc(void)
mutex_unlock(&freq_invariance_lock);
}
+void acpi_processor_init_invariance_cppc(void)
+{
+ init_freq_invariance_cppc();
+}
+
/*
* Get the highest performance register value.
* @cpu: CPU from which to get highest performance.
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/amd_nb.c b/arch/x86/kernel/amd_nb.c
index dc5d3216af24..9fe9972d2071 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/amd_nb.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/amd_nb.c
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@
#define PCI_DEVICE_ID_AMD_19H_M70H_DF_F4 0x14f4
#define PCI_DEVICE_ID_AMD_19H_M78H_DF_F4 0x12fc
#define PCI_DEVICE_ID_AMD_1AH_M00H_DF_F4 0x12c4
+#define PCI_DEVICE_ID_AMD_1AH_M20H_DF_F4 0x16fc
#define PCI_DEVICE_ID_AMD_1AH_M60H_DF_F4 0x124c
#define PCI_DEVICE_ID_AMD_1AH_M70H_DF_F4 0x12bc
#define PCI_DEVICE_ID_AMD_MI200_DF_F4 0x14d4
@@ -127,6 +128,7 @@ static const struct pci_device_id amd_nb_link_ids[] = {
{ PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_AMD, PCI_DEVICE_ID_AMD_19H_M78H_DF_F4) },
{ PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_AMD, PCI_DEVICE_ID_AMD_CNB17H_F4) },
{ PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_AMD, PCI_DEVICE_ID_AMD_1AH_M00H_DF_F4) },
+ { PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_AMD, PCI_DEVICE_ID_AMD_1AH_M20H_DF_F4) },
{ PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_AMD, PCI_DEVICE_ID_AMD_1AH_M60H_DF_F4) },
{ PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_AMD, PCI_DEVICE_ID_AMD_1AH_M70H_DF_F4) },
{ PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_AMD, PCI_DEVICE_ID_AMD_MI200_DF_F4) },
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c
index 6513c53c9459..c5fb28e6451a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c
@@ -440,7 +440,19 @@ static int lapic_timer_shutdown(struct clock_event_device *evt)
v = apic_read(APIC_LVTT);
v |= (APIC_LVT_MASKED | LOCAL_TIMER_VECTOR);
apic_write(APIC_LVTT, v);
- apic_write(APIC_TMICT, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * Setting APIC_LVT_MASKED (above) should be enough to tell
+ * the hardware that this timer will never fire. But AMD
+ * erratum 411 and some Intel CPU behavior circa 2024 say
+ * otherwise. Time for belt and suspenders programming: mask
+ * the timer _and_ zero the counter registers:
+ */
+ if (v & APIC_LVT_TIMER_TSCDEADLINE)
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_TSC_DEADLINE, 0);
+ else
+ apic_write(APIC_TMICT, 0);
+
return 0;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
index 015971adadfc..823f44f7bc94 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -924,6 +924,17 @@ static void init_amd_zen4(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
msr_set_bit(MSR_ZEN4_BP_CFG, MSR_ZEN4_BP_CFG_SHARED_BTB_FIX_BIT);
+
+ /*
+ * These Zen4 SoCs advertise support for virtualized VMLOAD/VMSAVE
+ * in some BIOS versions but they can lead to random host reboots.
+ */
+ switch (c->x86_model) {
+ case 0x18 ... 0x1f:
+ case 0x60 ... 0x7f:
+ clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_V_VMSAVE_VMLOAD);
+ break;
+ }
}
static void init_amd_zen5(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
@@ -1202,5 +1213,6 @@ void amd_check_microcode(void)
if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD)
return;
- on_each_cpu(zenbleed_check_cpu, NULL, 1);
+ if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_ZEN2))
+ on_each_cpu(zenbleed_check_cpu, NULL, 1);
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index d1915427b4ff..47a01d4028f6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1115,8 +1115,25 @@ do_cmd_auto:
case RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB:
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB);
+
+ /*
+ * IBPB on entry already obviates the need for
+ * software-based untraining so clear those in case some
+ * other mitigation like SRSO has selected them.
+ */
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_UNRET);
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK);
+
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT);
mitigate_smt = true;
+
+ /*
+ * There is no need for RSB filling: entry_ibpb() ensures
+ * all predictions, including the RSB, are invalidated,
+ * regardless of IBPB implementation.
+ */
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT);
+
break;
case RETBLEED_MITIGATION_STUFF:
@@ -2627,6 +2644,14 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
if (has_microcode) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB);
srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB;
+
+ /*
+ * IBPB on entry already obviates the need for
+ * software-based untraining so clear those in case some
+ * other mitigation like Retbleed has selected them.
+ */
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_UNRET);
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK);
}
} else {
pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY.\n");
@@ -2638,6 +2663,13 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB) && has_microcode) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT);
srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT;
+
+ /*
+ * There is no need for RSB filling: entry_ibpb() ensures
+ * all predictions, including the RSB, are invalidated,
+ * regardless of IBPB implementation.
+ */
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT);
}
} else {
pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with MITIGATION_SRSO.\n");
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index 07a34d723505..f43bb974fc66 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@
#include <asm/sev.h>
#include <asm/tdx.h>
#include <asm/posted_intr.h>
+#include <asm/runtime-const.h>
#include "cpu.h"
@@ -1443,6 +1444,9 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_BHI);
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB) && !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET))
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_IBPB_NO_RET);
+
if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN))
return;
@@ -2085,8 +2089,10 @@ void syscall_init(void)
#ifdef CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR
DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned long, __stack_chk_guard);
+#ifndef CONFIG_SMP
EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL(__stack_chk_guard);
#endif
+#endif
#endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
@@ -2386,6 +2392,15 @@ void __init arch_cpu_finalize_init(void)
alternative_instructions();
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64)) {
+ unsigned long USER_PTR_MAX = TASK_SIZE_MAX-1;
+
+ /*
+ * Enable this when LAM is gated on LASS support
+ if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_LAM))
+ USER_PTR_MAX = (1ul << 63) - PAGE_SIZE - 1;
+ */
+ runtime_const_init(ptr, USER_PTR_MAX);
+
/*
* Make sure the first 2MB area is not mapped by huge pages
* There are typically fixed size MTRRs in there and overlapping
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/amd.c
index f63b051f25a0..31a73715d755 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/amd.c
@@ -584,7 +584,7 @@ void __init load_ucode_amd_bsp(struct early_load_data *ed, unsigned int cpuid_1_
native_rdmsr(MSR_AMD64_PATCH_LEVEL, ed->new_rev, dummy);
}
-static enum ucode_state load_microcode_amd(u8 family, const u8 *data, size_t size);
+static enum ucode_state _load_microcode_amd(u8 family, const u8 *data, size_t size);
static int __init save_microcode_in_initrd(void)
{
@@ -605,7 +605,7 @@ static int __init save_microcode_in_initrd(void)
if (!desc.mc)
return -EINVAL;
- ret = load_microcode_amd(x86_family(cpuid_1_eax), desc.data, desc.size);
+ ret = _load_microcode_amd(x86_family(cpuid_1_eax), desc.data, desc.size);
if (ret > UCODE_UPDATED)
return -EINVAL;
@@ -613,16 +613,19 @@ static int __init save_microcode_in_initrd(void)
}
early_initcall(save_microcode_in_initrd);
-static inline bool patch_cpus_equivalent(struct ucode_patch *p, struct ucode_patch *n)
+static inline bool patch_cpus_equivalent(struct ucode_patch *p,
+ struct ucode_patch *n,
+ bool ignore_stepping)
{
/* Zen and newer hardcode the f/m/s in the patch ID */
if (x86_family(bsp_cpuid_1_eax) >= 0x17) {
union cpuid_1_eax p_cid = ucode_rev_to_cpuid(p->patch_id);
union cpuid_1_eax n_cid = ucode_rev_to_cpuid(n->patch_id);
- /* Zap stepping */
- p_cid.stepping = 0;
- n_cid.stepping = 0;
+ if (ignore_stepping) {
+ p_cid.stepping = 0;
+ n_cid.stepping = 0;
+ }
return p_cid.full == n_cid.full;
} else {
@@ -644,13 +647,13 @@ static struct ucode_patch *cache_find_patch(struct ucode_cpu_info *uci, u16 equi
WARN_ON_ONCE(!n.patch_id);
list_for_each_entry(p, &microcode_cache, plist)
- if (patch_cpus_equivalent(p, &n))
+ if (patch_cpus_equivalent(p, &n, false))
return p;
return NULL;
}
-static inline bool patch_newer(struct ucode_patch *p, struct ucode_patch *n)
+static inline int patch_newer(struct ucode_patch *p, struct ucode_patch *n)
{
/* Zen and newer hardcode the f/m/s in the patch ID */
if (x86_family(bsp_cpuid_1_eax) >= 0x17) {
@@ -659,6 +662,9 @@ static inline bool patch_newer(struct ucode_patch *p, struct ucode_patch *n)
zp.ucode_rev = p->patch_id;
zn.ucode_rev = n->patch_id;
+ if (zn.stepping != zp.stepping)
+ return -1;
+
return zn.rev > zp.rev;
} else {
return n->patch_id > p->patch_id;
@@ -668,10 +674,14 @@ static inline bool patch_newer(struct ucode_patch *p, struct ucode_patch *n)
static void update_cache(struct ucode_patch *new_patch)
{
struct ucode_patch *p;
+ int ret;
list_for_each_entry(p, &microcode_cache, plist) {
- if (patch_cpus_equivalent(p, new_patch)) {
- if (!patch_newer(p, new_patch)) {
+ if (patch_cpus_equivalent(p, new_patch, true)) {
+ ret = patch_newer(p, new_patch);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ continue;
+ else if (!ret) {
/* we already have the latest patch */
kfree(new_patch->data);
kfree(new_patch);
@@ -944,21 +954,30 @@ static enum ucode_state __load_microcode_amd(u8 family, const u8 *data,
return UCODE_OK;
}
-static enum ucode_state load_microcode_amd(u8 family, const u8 *data, size_t size)
+static enum ucode_state _load_microcode_amd(u8 family, const u8 *data, size_t size)
{
- struct cpuinfo_x86 *c;
- unsigned int nid, cpu;
- struct ucode_patch *p;
enum ucode_state ret;
/* free old equiv table */
free_equiv_cpu_table();
ret = __load_microcode_amd(family, data, size);
- if (ret != UCODE_OK) {
+ if (ret != UCODE_OK)
cleanup();
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static enum ucode_state load_microcode_amd(u8 family, const u8 *data, size_t size)
+{
+ struct cpuinfo_x86 *c;
+ unsigned int nid, cpu;
+ struct ucode_patch *p;
+ enum ucode_state ret;
+
+ ret = _load_microcode_amd(family, data, size);
+ if (ret != UCODE_OK)
return ret;
- }
for_each_node(nid) {
cpu = cpumask_first(cpumask_of_node(nid));
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/core.c
index 8591d53c144b..b681c2e07dbf 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/core.c
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ static inline bool rdt_get_mb_table(struct rdt_resource *r)
return false;
}
-static bool __get_mem_config_intel(struct rdt_resource *r)
+static __init bool __get_mem_config_intel(struct rdt_resource *r)
{
struct rdt_hw_resource *hw_res = resctrl_to_arch_res(r);
union cpuid_0x10_3_eax eax;
@@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ static bool __get_mem_config_intel(struct rdt_resource *r)
return true;
}
-static bool __rdt_get_mem_config_amd(struct rdt_resource *r)
+static __init bool __rdt_get_mem_config_amd(struct rdt_resource *r)
{
struct rdt_hw_resource *hw_res = resctrl_to_arch_res(r);
u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx, subleaf;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/ctrlmondata.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/ctrlmondata.c
index 50fa1fe9a073..200d89a64027 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/ctrlmondata.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/ctrlmondata.c
@@ -29,10 +29,10 @@
* hardware. The allocated bandwidth percentage is rounded to the next
* control step available on the hardware.
*/
-static bool bw_validate(char *buf, unsigned long *data, struct rdt_resource *r)
+static bool bw_validate(char *buf, u32 *data, struct rdt_resource *r)
{
- unsigned long bw;
int ret;
+ u32 bw;
/*
* Only linear delay values is supported for current Intel SKUs.
@@ -42,16 +42,21 @@ static bool bw_validate(char *buf, unsigned long *data, struct rdt_resource *r)
return false;
}
- ret = kstrtoul(buf, 10, &bw);
+ ret = kstrtou32(buf, 10, &bw);
if (ret) {
- rdt_last_cmd_printf("Non-decimal digit in MB value %s\n", buf);
+ rdt_last_cmd_printf("Invalid MB value %s\n", buf);
return false;
}
- if ((bw < r->membw.min_bw || bw > r->default_ctrl) &&
- !is_mba_sc(r)) {
- rdt_last_cmd_printf("MB value %ld out of range [%d,%d]\n", bw,
- r->membw.min_bw, r->default_ctrl);
+ /* Nothing else to do if software controller is enabled. */
+ if (is_mba_sc(r)) {
+ *data = bw;
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ if (bw < r->membw.min_bw || bw > r->default_ctrl) {
+ rdt_last_cmd_printf("MB value %u out of range [%d,%d]\n",
+ bw, r->membw.min_bw, r->default_ctrl);
return false;
}
@@ -65,7 +70,7 @@ int parse_bw(struct rdt_parse_data *data, struct resctrl_schema *s,
struct resctrl_staged_config *cfg;
u32 closid = data->rdtgrp->closid;
struct rdt_resource *r = s->res;
- unsigned long bw_val;
+ u32 bw_val;
cfg = &d->staged_config[s->conf_type];
if (cfg->have_new_ctrl) {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c
index 9ace84486499..eb5848d1851a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c
@@ -901,19 +901,15 @@ static struct miscdevice sgx_dev_provision = {
int sgx_set_attribute(unsigned long *allowed_attributes,
unsigned int attribute_fd)
{
- struct fd f = fdget(attribute_fd);
+ CLASS(fd, f)(attribute_fd);
- if (!fd_file(f))
+ if (fd_empty(f))
return -EINVAL;
- if (fd_file(f)->f_op != &sgx_provision_fops) {
- fdput(f);
+ if (fd_file(f)->f_op != &sgx_provision_fops)
return -EINVAL;
- }
*allowed_attributes |= SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY;
-
- fdput(f);
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sgx_set_attribute);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
index 263f8aed4e2c..21e9e4845354 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
#include <asm/apic.h>
#include <asm/apicdef.h>
#include <asm/hypervisor.h>
+#include <asm/mtrr.h>
#include <asm/tlb.h>
#include <asm/cpuidle_haltpoll.h>
#include <asm/ptrace.h>
@@ -980,6 +981,9 @@ static void __init kvm_init_platform(void)
}
kvmclock_init();
x86_platform.apic_post_init = kvm_apic_init;
+
+ /* Set WB as the default cache mode for SEV-SNP and TDX */
+ mtrr_overwrite_state(NULL, 0, MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK);
}
#if defined(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
index 0e0a4cf6b5eb..615922838c51 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
@@ -530,7 +530,7 @@ static inline void kb_wait(void)
static inline void nmi_shootdown_cpus_on_restart(void);
-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_AMD)
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_X86)
/* RCU-protected callback to disable virtualization prior to reboot. */
static cpu_emergency_virt_cb __rcu *cpu_emergency_virt_callback;
@@ -600,7 +600,7 @@ static void emergency_reboot_disable_virtualization(void)
}
#else
static void emergency_reboot_disable_virtualization(void) { }
-#endif /* CONFIG_KVM_INTEL || CONFIG_KVM_AMD */
+#endif /* CONFIG_KVM_X86 */
void __attribute__((weak)) mach_reboot_fixups(void)
{
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
index d05392db5d0f..2dbadf347b5f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
@@ -261,12 +261,6 @@ static noinstr bool handle_bug(struct pt_regs *regs)
int ud_type;
u32 imm;
- /*
- * Normally @regs are unpoisoned by irqentry_enter(), but handle_bug()
- * is a rare case that uses @regs without passing them to
- * irqentry_enter().
- */
- kmsan_unpoison_entry_regs(regs);
ud_type = decode_bug(regs->ip, &imm);
if (ud_type == BUG_NONE)
return handled;
@@ -276,6 +270,12 @@ static noinstr bool handle_bug(struct pt_regs *regs)
*/
instrumentation_begin();
/*
+ * Normally @regs are unpoisoned by irqentry_enter(), but handle_bug()
+ * is a rare case that uses @regs without passing them to
+ * irqentry_enter().
+ */
+ kmsan_unpoison_entry_regs(regs);
+ /*
* Since we're emulating a CALL with exceptions, restore the interrupt
* state to what it was at the exception site.
*/
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
index 6726be89b7a6..feb8102a9ca7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
@@ -358,6 +358,7 @@ SECTIONS
#endif
RUNTIME_CONST_VARIABLES
+ RUNTIME_CONST(ptr, USER_PTR_MAX)
. = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);
@@ -490,6 +491,9 @@ SECTIONS
. = ASSERT((_end - LOAD_OFFSET <= KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE),
"kernel image bigger than KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE");
+/* needed for Clang - see arch/x86/entry/entry.S */
+PROVIDE(__ref_stack_chk_guard = __stack_chk_guard);
+
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
/*
* Per-cpu symbols which need to be offset from __per_cpu_load